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 PRÓLOGO  	  
Tras un acto de reflexión histórica y social observamos que tras tantos años de 
evolución y progreso, aún hoy día la sociedad no ha logrado solventar la mayor 
fuente de mortalidad y pobreza, las guerras.  
Desde los países desarrollados observamos con consternación a millones de 
individuos que desde los países en vía de desarrollo luchan desesperadamente por 
sobrevivir, por progresar. 
La sociedad civil aún cuando en ciertas ocasiones emprende alternativas con la 
voluntad de la cooperación social internacional, delega la responsabilidad final a 
Gobiernos e Instituciones Internacionales, confiando que la intervención de estos 
organismos establezca soluciones de corto y largo plazo, restableciendo la paz y 
creando fuentes de crecimiento económico.  
El objetivo de este trabajo es ayudar a entender en mayor medida el gran efecto que 
las decisiones que se toman en el mundo desarrollado, tienen en los países en 
desarrollo. Presentamos un análisis objetivo de las fuentes de conflicto y del progreso 
y transformación que ha sufrido la economía bélica, que tras el fin de la Guerra Fría, 
ha pasado de guerras financiadas por el Estado a conflictos financiados y guiados por 
intereses privados. Hoy en día las guerras son mayoritariamente financiadas por la 
explotación ilegal de drogas, armamento y recursos naturales.  
Los recursos naturales, que podrían ser vistos como una fuente de riqueza y 
crecimiento económico, se convierten en lo que los académicos han dado por 
denominar ¨la maldición de los recursos naturales¨.  
En este trabajo nos centramos en los conflictos financiados por la explotación ilegal 
de recursos naturales (oro, diamantes y Coltan, entre otros). Y dedicamos especial 
atención al mercado del Coltan y su relación con el conflicto armado aún vigente en 
República Democrática del Congo (RDC).  
Coltan es lo que se denomina un metal precioso, esencial para la industria de 
armamento y la alta tecnología. El Coltan es uno de los lazos de unión más 
importantes entre nuestro mundo evolucionado y el conflicto en RDC y que hace en 
cierta medida responsable a los países desarrollados de los abusos que se están 
llevando a cabo en RDC.  
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Cuando tomamos la decisión de comprarnos un móvil, posiblemente guiados por la 
necesidad básica de comunicarnos y de no conocer las consecuencias de nuestra 
acción, indirectamente podríamos estar financiando la guerra que ha costado ya 
millones de vidas en RDC.  
Hemos dividido nuestro análisis en los siguientes tres capítulos: 
El primer capítulo presenta un análisis detallado de la naturaleza y tipos de conflicto. 
Y en él se examina la opinión de distintos investigadores sobre las causas y los 
factores que influencian las guerras civiles, especialmente aquellas financiadas por la 
explotación de recursos naturales. Terminamos el capítulo presentando diversas 
medidas adoptadas por distintos organismos con la finalidad de regular los mercados 
de recursos naturales y aportar soluciones que conduzcan a estabilidad en la zona y la 
creación de una situación de paz. 
El capítulo dos presenta un análisis político-económico de RDC, desde una 
perspectiva histórica. Y analiza el negocio de Coltan en RDC.   
El capítulo tres, es un análisis de las causas económicas de los conflictos bélicos, 
inspirado por las palabras del General Carl von Clausewitz (1832), que ya en el siglo 
XIX, dijo que ¨el mundo de los negocios era una forma de competencia humana que 
se parecía mucho a los conflictos bélicos¨. A través de la modelización económica y a 
través de la metodología de inducción hacia atrás hemos analizado el efecto de 
contagio de la guerra entre dos países limítrofes que compiten en el mercado 
internacional de un mismo producto, y donde el Gobierno compite con el sector 
privado en el mercado laboral para la contratación de soldados. De forma que la 
decisión de la cantidad del número de soldados que el Gobierno opta por contratar y 
los impuestos que el Gobierno establece para financiar el conflicto, afectan 
directamente al sector privado y por ende al mercado de output. 
Nuestros modelos corroboran que las guerras financiadas por la explotación de 
recursos naturales se deben a:  
1. La existencia de un recurso natural que supone una oportunidad de negocio 
para las empresas y por tanto, éstas se establecen en el país. Esto permite al 
Gobierno obtener financiación para sustentar la guerra, por medio de la 
imposición de tributos. 
2. El mercado de trabajo es muy elástico en los países en vía de desarrollo, y 
observamos que el beneficio del Gobierno incrementa cuanto más elástico es 
el mercado laboral.  
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Los modelos por tanto prueban un efecto de contagio entre países donde existe una 
complementariedad estratégica y además explica por qué los Gobiernos pueden 
tener una motivación especial en apoyar los conflictos bélicos en los países donde 
concurren las dos siguientes circunstancias: 
1. Existencia recursos naturales. 
2. El mercado laboral es muy elástico. 
Por tanto, concluimos que las autoridades y organizaciones internacionales 
necesitan hacer un análisis amplio del contexto económico en la zona de conflicto 
antes de diseñar e implementar políticas económicas y estrategias de paz. 
También hemos hecho referencia a diferentes soluciones que se han llevado a cabo 
tanto por Naciones Unidas, el Gobierno USA o la OCDE. Sin embargo, tras 
nuestro análisis de la situación actual de la RDC, observamos que ninguna de estas 
acciones han tenido los efectos esperados o mejorado en gran medida la situación 
económica y social en el país.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The twentieth century was a convulsive one in terms of wars, political conflicts and 
terrorism. Crime is now more international than it has ever been before. These days, 
geographical borders do not limit any war; conflicts are cross-border. The nature of 
armed conflicts has suffered a deep transformation. The most relevant change is 
moving from state-financed wars to armed conflicts financed by private parties with 
dark financial interests.  
The end of the Cold War established the end of an era where the State had the central 
role in the establishment and financing of the conflict. We now speak about “New 
Wars” (Kaldor, 2012). State armies no longer characterise the conflicts of the post-
Cold War era; states have lost the monopoly of violence (Munkler, 2002). The new 
actors leading the “new wars” are local warlords, paramilitary units, criminal gangs 
and mercenary groups who challenge the authority of the state (Kaldor, 2013). 
Currently, the figures by IISS (“Institute for International Strategic Studies”) reflect 
42 active conflicts and two global, Al Qaeda and ISIS (Islamic State). Crime has 
expanded internationally and can affect directly or indirectly each single individual; 
and civil wars have not only national consequences but also international ones.  
These days, no matter where we are, we cannot hide and we can always be the targets 
of any type of crime. Fear lives among us in airports, in trains or even at our office. 
However, we should be aware of the moral, legal and political responsibility that we, 
developed world, have on the on-going conflicts in the developing countries. Despite 
the lack of acknowledgment in the official discourse, most of the natural resources 
nourishing the current conflicts are destined to the consumer market in the developed 
countries. We could be supporting financially an on-going civil war somewhere in the 
world with only the simplest act of buying a mobile phone. 
Mobile phones contain a very little portion of a mineral called Coltan, short for 
Columbite-Tantalite. This Coltan most probably has been extracted in Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). Nonetheless, the phone producer might have bought the 
Coltan in Rwanda. The way our little portion of Coltan went from DRC to Rwanda 
was probably illegal. The consequences of this “conflict” trade are linked to the 
nature of the current armed conflicts and to the reasons for the contemporary 
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conflicts. If we can analyse what are the causes, then, could we envisage what are the 
solutions? 
There is a large number of scholarly and political studies about the political economy 
of many of our contemporary armed conflicts, especially those characterised by the 
predatory exploitation of natural resources and the criminalisation of economic life 
(Berdal and Malone, 2000). The common point among these conflicts is mainly their 
“self-financing” nature. These war economies are based on the illegal trade of natural 
resources facilitated by the economic globalisation and the financial market 
liberalization.  
As we will see in this work, civil wars can have a contagion effect upon adjacent 
countries. It is this complicated reality of intra-state wars that presents policymakers 
with a twofold challenge. Firstly, to assess accurately the impact of resource 
predation on the economics and dynamics of the conflict. Secondly, to develop and 
implement effective policies of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding (Ballentine and Nitzsche, 2005). 
Traditionally, scholars focused on the study of the economic dimensions of inter-state 
wars. However after the Cold War, studies began to focus on the intra-state conflicts 
as it has been demonstrated that countries with an abundance of natural resources 
show macroeconomic instability, high level of corruption, oppressive elites and 
increasing level of poverty. This is known as the “paradox of plenty”, or the 
“resource curse”, as for these countries, resource wealth is more a curse than a 
blessing. 
This work intends to be an overview of the economics of armed conflicts. We focus 
on those conflicts that are financed by the exploitation of natural resources and we 
run some empirical analysis on the effect of governmental measures to control or 
promote war. We aim to raise awareness on the lack of social and political 
accountability from governments and international institutions of the developed 
world on the current conflicts financed by the illicit trade of natural resources in 
developing countries.  
Our first chapter provides the reader with a general background on the economics and 
dynamics of armed conflict and gives an update on the current theories and findings. 
We analyse what is an armed conflict and offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
dimensions that define the nature and type of war. We characterise the different types 
of wars as per location and scope; and we also examine the diverse opinions of 
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scholars on the causal roles of economic factors in civil wars and how natural 
resources are linked to conflict. In the last section, we evaluate the possible solutions 
that United Nations might implement in order to achieve conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding.  
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the political and economic environment in 
DRC, a country rich in natural resources, and especially in Coltan. That is the product 
to which we will pay special attention in Chapter 3 when we analyse the competitive 
interaction in the labour market between governments and producers. 
We introduce in Chapter 3 a different set of models, theoretical and empirical where 
we evaluate the effects of governmental responses (economic policy tools), which are 
often presented in the political discourse as mechanisms for conflict prevention and 
resolution. We analyse the effect of a tax on product and tax on profits in an economy 
where market and war activities exist at the same time.  
We suggest a novel approach to the interaction between markets and war activities. 
Specifically the former are assumed to both favour war by generating the resources 
necessary to sustain it, as well as compete with war activities in a labour market in 
which both workers and soldiers are recruited. We argue that war activities in two 
different countries may be interdependent as long as production and exports in an 
international market make the two countries’ producers interact with each other. In 
such a framework, strategic substitutability in the product market should be combined 
with strategic relations between economic and war activities in each country to 
determine the predicted strategic relation between war activities across countries. 
The conclusions to our work can be found in the last section. 
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FOREWORD 
“Those who wish to facilitate peace will be well advised to understand the nature of 
war. Yet the label “war” is one that often conceals as much as it reveals. We think 
we know what a war is, but this in itself is a source of difficulty: throwing a label at 
the problem of conflict may further obscure its origins and functions; and the label, 
moreover, may be very useful for those who wish to promote certain kinds of 
violence.” 
David Keen, 2000-b 
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1 - INTRODUCTION 
Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century, armed conflicts are not a story of the past 
yet.  
Most probably, each one of us has at least once a week read an article in the press 
about some war going on somewhere in the world. We might even have some specific 
pieces of information about the current situation in the area of conflict, little snippets 
that we have gleaned here and there, so we have come up with some kind of 
conclusion on who are the goodies and who are the baddies.  
Following the latest figures published by the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (ISS), in 2014, there were 42 active conflicts that caused 180,000 fatalities 
and 12,181,000 refugees worldwide. Two of these conflicts are considered global and 
come under the umbrella of International Terrorism derived from Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State (ISIS).  
In the light of these figures, the need for a better understanding of war reveals our 
lack of knowledge on the concept.  
The reality is that the approach to the armed conflicts is complicated. War is mutant, 
it transforms over time and it is influenced by multitude of factors: demographic, 
religious, geographical, political … the concept is not simple, quite the opposite, it is 
complicated to understand and even more difficult to resolve. One of the goals of this 
current work is to analyse the nature of war. We try to provide at least a general vision 
on the concept of armed conflict.  
There are multitudes of books and articles tackling the war from very different 
approaches. We will begin from a very general historical overview to begin step-by-
step to concentrate our discussion on what has been denominated as “resource wars”. 
The resource wars are part of a more general concept defined by Kaldor (2012) called 
“new wars”.   
We have seen throughout the twentieth century how wars have transformed from 
state-financed conflicts to self-financed wars. The end of the Cold War had great 
impact on the patterns of war and peace in developing countries; the end of the 
military support by United States and Soviet Union provided, in some cases, new 
opportunities for conflict resolution and, in other cases, it resulted in an increase of 
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instability, precipitating indirectly the appearance of new civil wars. We see that the 
nature and dimensions of the armed conflict have changed. The behaviour of 
combatants reveals not only how the war is fought but also why. Keen (2000-a) has 
suggested that, where combatants engage in conflict to resource accumulation, “there 
may be more to war than winning”.  
Today, also accelerated by the global crisis, we are observing rapid shifts from 
traditional great powers to emerging actors within the international system. New 
conflict drivers threaten to increase social tensions in fragile states, where elites and 
non-state actors accumulate control over civilians, territory and market share. In this 
always-evolving landscape, different organisations and actors seek for new crisis-
response strategies to maintain international peace and security.    
We present in this chapter a comprehensive analysis of the dimensions that define the 
nature and type of war. We characterise the different types of wars as per the location 
and scope of the armed conflict, and we present the general definition of what inter-
state, intra-state, non-state and extra-state conflicts are. 
Following scholars such as Kaldor (2012), Gates (2002) and Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) among others, we identify the different types of source of conflict and 
establish the status of the conflict in relation to its intensity; we provide a tabulation 
of the forty-two active conflicts identified by the ISS. And lastly, in this identification 
of the factors defining the nature of war, we discuss the financial dimension, 
introducing the concept of “new wars”, to which we will dedicate special attention in 
a separate section.  
In our journey, we also examine the diverse opinions of scholars on the causal roles of 
economic factors in civil wars. Following Collier and Hoeffler (1998), we discuss the 
importance of the economic agendas of the rebels as a potential cause and we present 
his famously recognised model of Greed and Grievance where he utilises different 
proxy variables to measure the impact of greed and grievance on the conflict. We will 
discover that Collier arrives at unexpected results.  
Another possible cause of conflict is the relation between the predatory exploitation of 
natural resources and the violent conflict. Ballentine and Nitzche (2005) identify three 
connection points: “The paradox of plenty”, the duration of the conflict and the moral, 
legal and political responsibility of the developed countries’ players (companies and 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
Chapter 1	  	  
  Page 21 
governments) on the dynamics of the conflict. We also extend our research to the 
views of other scholars, who, through case studies, provide evidence that the 
existence of natural resources have contributed to the inception, duration and intensity 
of civil wars. We present the results of Ross (2001) who analyses thirteen conflicts 
between 1994 and 2000, concluding that natural resources tend to influence separatist 
conflicts differently to non-separatist. 
In our last section, we present the possible actions to resolve civil wars. We first 
analyse the policy tools and strategies for conflict prevention and resolution. And, 
secondly, we present and evaluate the different actions that have been carried out 
from international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council to resolve civil 
wars or implement strategies of peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping 
(United Nations, 2003).  
When analysing the policy tools and strategies, we begin presenting the links between 
the financial outcome of the exploitation and trade of the natural resources and the 
armed conflict identified by Humphreys (2005):  
1. National elites can monopolise the rents obtained by the exploitation of natural 
resources. 
2. The wealth originated by a country’s natural resource can derive in political 
grievances ‘that may ultimately turn violent”. 
3. The economic instability derived from the socio-political distortions associated 
with the high level of dependence of the country on the wealth of natural 
resources.  
4. The exploitation of natural resources to sustain the conflict alive via supporting 
financially their combatants. 
5. Under circumstances where parties in a conflict gain more during wartime than in 
a period of peace, the likelihood of a longer warfare increases.  
We then address certain policy instruments and initiatives that have been 
implemented successfully as “the name and shaming” initiative by Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), the Kimberley Certificates or the Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering (FATF) to monitor the financial transactions involved in 
conflict trade. We realise that the technology at the reach of criminal networks and 
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globalisation are determinant on the shape of the “new war”, which seems quite 
difficult to control only geographically. 
After this, we will concentrate our attention on the analysis of the level of 
involvement of United Nations (UN) in conflict resolution. We first introduce briefly 
the institution itself for a better understanding of its nature and goals. However, to 
find out how UN decides upon which conflict to engage, we follow Cockayne et al. 
(2010) who present a complete analysis of the level of engagement of UN from the 
year of 1989 to 2006. We will end this chapter by evaluating the strategies of UN and 
making certain recommendations for a more efficient strategy of peace 
implementation by UN, following Downs and Stedman (2002). 
 
2 - WHAT IS WAR? Inside the Nature of the Armed Conflict 
Since Clausewitz1 in the nineteenth century wrote in his treaty about the science of 
war that “war belongs not to the province of Arts and Sciences but to the province of 
social life … It would be better, instead of comparing it with any Art, to liken it to 
business competition, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities”, much 
has been said about armed conflicts.  
Clausewitz defined war as an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil 
our will. He establishes that “violence” is the means and “the submission of the 
enemy to our will” is therefore the object.  
However, the object of war has since transformed into much more than just the search 
for the surrender of the enemy.  
Kaldor (2012) contends that what we (the general public), the policymakers and 
military forces tend to regard as war is in reality an evolution of a specific 
phenomenon that took shape in Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth century. 
This was a phenomenon deeply related with the evolution of the modern state and 
which went through different states as the Table 1 on the next page shows.  
Different types of military forces, strategies and techniques characterised each of 
these stages. However, globalisation and the current modern state give shape to new 
types of Government and therefore, the armed conflict as we conceive it today is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  General Carl Von Clausewitz was born at Burg in 1780. He joined the Prussian Army in 1792 and served in the campaigns of 
1793-94 on the Rhine, after which he devoted some time to the study of his military leadership. He wrote during his lifetime a 
treaty on the science of war, which was published by his wife after his death. It has been published in nine volumes. 
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becoming outdated. The current concept of warfare is just an evolution of the stylised 
notion of war, reminiscent of a type of war predominantly European. Nevertheless, 
this archaic notion of war still influences our concept of war and dominates, even 
these days, how policymakers conceive national security. Kaldor (2012) counters that 
it is this preoccupation with the old war that prevents us from developing policy-
relevant analysis and that attention should be focused on the concept of human 
security as a way to address “new wars”. For further details on this concept, see 
Kaldor (2007) and Kaldor and Beebe (2010). 
 
Table 1: The evolution of Old Wars. 
 17th and 18th 
Centuries 
19th Century  Early 20th 
Century 
Late 20th 
Century 
TYPE OF 
POLITY 
Absolutist State Nation-State 
Coalitions of 
States; 
Multinational 
States; Empires 
Blocs 
GOALS OF 
WAR 
Reasons of State; 
dynastic conflict; 
consolidation of 
borders 
National conflict 
National and 
ideological 
conflict 
Ideological 
conflict 
TYPE OF 
ARMY 
Mercenary/professional Professional/conscription Mass armies 
Scientific-
military 
elite/professional 
armies 
MILITARY 
TECHNIQUE 
Use of firearms, 
defensive manoeuvres, 
sieges 
Railways and telegraph, 
rapid mobilisation 
Massive 
firepower, tanks 
and aircraft 
Nuclear weapons 
WAR 
ECONOMY 
Regularisation of 
taxation and borrowing 
Expansion of 
administration and 
bureaucracy 
Mobilisation 
economy  
Military-
industrial 
complex 
 Source: Kaldor (2012) 
 
However, there must be some light at the end of this tunnel; the wave of peaceful 
protest started in the Middle East and that has extended worldwide has marginalised 
extremist militant groups including Al Qaeda. This response by the general public, 
which Kaldor labelled as “cosmopolitan politics”, is key to finding a solution for the 
new wars. However, the outcome depends on the effect that this global response has 
on the institutional response.  
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In order to produce an effective response to the warfare, institutions and politicians 
need to begin with a broad study of the problem. As we will see later on, Downs and 
Stedman (2002) recommend that to implement effective strategies on conflict 
resolution or peacebuilding, institutions such as United Nations need to carry out an 
assessment of the conflict.  
 
We identify the following four dimensions defining the nature of the conflict:   
1. Geographical dimension 
The impact of geography on armed conflict has been studied in deep analysis and we 
can find multitude of studies where geography is analysed as a relevant factor. 
Sprout (1963) already claimed that climate, topography and location were 
determinants of state behaviour. More recent studies focus on the relation between 
geographic proximity and conflict. Bremer (1992) finds geographic proximity to both 
facilitate and exist as a source of conflict. Gates (2002) in a paper on the 
microfoundations of rebellion, identifies geography, ideology and ethnicity as the 
factors determining the military success and shaping rebel recruitment. Buhaug and 
Gates (2002) considered location and scope to be key on the definition of the 
characteristics of any armed conflict. 
Considering the geographical dimension of the armed conflict, we can identify the 
following types of conflicts: 
• Inter-state conflicts involve an armed conflict between two or more 
countries/governments and usually begin with a formal declaration. 
• Intra-state conflicts take place between state and non-state armed forces. We 
may find that sometimes one of the groups involved is supported by troops of a 
foreign country. These are commonly known as “Civil wars”. 
• Non-state conflict involves the use of armed forces by two or more organised 
groups, none of which are the Government.  
• Extra-state conflict occurs when an armed conflict involves a Government and a 
political entity outside the state boundaries. We can define it as state vs. an 
independent non-state player. 
Diehl (1991) analyses broadly the impact of geographical factors on inter-state 
conflicts from two standpoints: taking geography as a facilitating condition for 
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conflict and taking geography as a source of conflict. Buhaug and Gates (2002) state 
that geographical factors are determinant on how a civil war (intra-state conflict) is 
fought and who will prevail. The authors using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation techniques analyse factors that determine 
the scope and location of the conflict; finding that factors such, as for instance, the 
incidence of natural resources shaped the scope of the conflict. In addition, they also 
find evidence of an endogenous relationship between variables, scope and location.  
2. Source of conflict 
Another dimension in the study of armed conflict is the identification of the source or 
nature of the conflict, which can be political, socio-cultural, economic or territorial. 
However, usually, the sources of conflict are inter-linked and we can identify more 
than one unique source of conflict. Our perception of the nature and origin of the 
conflict may also be altered by the media, which often consider the main reason of 
every conflict to be of cultural or religious dimension.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) state that economic agendas are central to understanding 
why civil wars start, as conflicts are more likely to happen because of economic 
opportunities than grievance. Those groups that benefit from the conflict –even when 
they are a minority; will feel motivated to initiate it and sustain it despite of the 
conflict destroying economic opportunities for the majority. The conflict might appear 
because the rebels search to increase their wealth by capturing resources illegally or 
because they aspire to rid the nation, or a certain group of people with whom they 
identify, of an unjust regime. These two extremely different motivations imply very 
different types of policy intervention by the international community when promoting 
peace. We shall discuss the different types of approach to peace at a later stage in this 
work.  
3. Status of the conflict 
Also important is to identify the status of the conflict and its intensity: the frequency 
and duration of the violent attack and the social impact of the conflict. ISS categorises 
the forty-two identified conflicts per its intensity, defining: 
• High Intensity: frequent armed clashes (involving fatalities) between 
governments, government forces and insurgents, or among non-state armed groups.  
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• Medium Intensity: frequent armed clashes (involving fatalities) between 
governments, government forces and insurgents, or among non-state armed groups.  
• Low Intensity: occasional armed clashes between governments, government 
forces and insurgents, or among non-state armed groups. 
 
All forty-two conflicts are organised by status as we see in Table 2:  
Table 2: Status of Conflicts 
STATUS COUNTRIES  
HIGH 
INTENSITY 
• Afghanistan 
• Iraq 
• Nigeria (Boko Haram) 
• Pakistan (Kpk and Northwest) 
 
• Somalia 
• South Sudan 
• Syria 
MEDIUM 
INTENSITY 
• Central African Republic 
• Central America (Northern Triangle) 
• China (Xinjiang) 
• Colombia 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
• Egypt (Sinai) 
• India (Naxalites) 
• India-Pakistan (Kashmir) 
• Israel-Palestine 
• Libya 
• Mexico (Cartels) 
 
• Myanmar 
• Pakistan (Balochistan) 
• Pakistan (Sectarian Violence) 
• Russia (North Caucasus) 
• Southern Thailand 
• Sudan (Darfur) 
• Mali (The Sahel) 
• Turkey (PKK) 
• Ukraine 
• Yemen (Houthis/AQAP/SMM) 
LOW 
INTENSITY 
• Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) 
• Central Asia 
• Ethiopia (ONLF/ONLA and OLF/OLA) 
• India (Assam) 
• India (Manipur) 
• India (Nagaland) 
• International Terrorism/Al-Qaeda 
 
• Lebanon-Hizbullah-Syria 
• Nigeria (Delta Region) 
• Philippines (ASG) 
• Philippines (MILF) 
• Philippines (NPA) 
• Southeast Asian Islamist Terrorism 
(SAIT) 
 Source ISS Armed Conflict Database, year 2014.	  
 
4. Financial dimension 
Another aspect on the study of the nature of armed conflict is the financial dimension. 
Grossman and Han (1991) present an extensive analysis of the finance and war-
spending policies of a state that faces a war; their analysis takes explicit account of 
the historical experiences of lenders who face debt repudiation if the state that they 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
Chapter 1	  	  
  Page 27 
supported is defeated or partial default even if the state avoids defeat, because of the 
unfavourable material consequences of the war for the debtor state.  
At this point, where we are focusing on the way the armed conflict is financed, when 
we need to draw a clear line between those wars that occurred before the end of the 
Cold War era and those that happened from the 1990s onwards.  
The end of the Cold War, as we mentioned in our introduction, meant the end of 
military and financial support from external patrons and, since then, wars have mostly 
become self-financed conflicts.  
Our work will be focusing from now on upon these self-financed wars, also called 
“new wars” or “resource wars”.  
3 - THE OLD AND NEW WARS 
Kaldor (2013) establishes a clear distinction between the “old wars” (from the Cold 
War era) and the “new wars” and creates a review of the literature on “new wars”. 
Williams (2014) argues that the obsession with the “newness” of wars misses the 
point about the logic of new wars and that, although the data should be used with 
caution, it does seem to offer support for some elements of the new war thesis, which 
contends that the actors, goals, methods and modes of financing wars after the Cold-
War have changed as a result of globalisation. 
State armies no longer characterise the conflicts of the post-Cold War era; states have 
lost the monopoly on violence (Munkler, 2002). The new actors leading the “new 
wars” are local warlords, paramilitary units, criminal gangs and mercenary groups 
who challenge the authority of the state (Kaldor, 2013). A higher level of civilian 
casualties also characterises “new wars”, as these are not clearly distinguished from 
combatants because the conflicts are more intra-state (Munkler, 2002). Also the goals 
of these “non-state” actors are different to the goals of the “old wars” where the 
conflicts where fought for ideological and/or geopolitical interests whereas, in the 
“new wars”, the goals are more ethnic, religious or the actors seeking to gain access 
into the state for specific groups rather than public interest (Kaldor, 2013).  
Finally, Kaldor’s “new war” thesis contends the appearance of a “new war economy” 
which is self-financed by illegal trade in drugs, weapons, natural resources with these 
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non-state actors seeking to maintain economic interest. This also differs from “old 
wars”, which the State financed through taxation or outside patrons (Kaldor, 2013). 
This concept of wars subsidised by elites is not new in history. However, since the 
early 1990s, the study of civil wars or armed conflicts self-financed from the revenues 
obtained from the exploitation of natural resources has gained an unprecedented 
central role in the public and political debate. So much attention has been devoted to 
its analysis that scholars have even created a new term to refer to it “resource wars”.  
One of the most outstanding examples of a “resource war” is the situation still alive in 
Democratic Republic of Congo where the conflict derived from the illegal trade and 
exploitation of their natural resources (copper, diamonds, gold, cobalt, coffee and 
Coltan) has had a devastating effect on their population and enriched certain elites; we 
will dedicate special attention to DRC throughout this work.  
4 - CAUSAL ROLES OF ECONOMIC FACTORS 
A - Economic Agendas as Causes of Conflict - The Greed-Grievance Model by 
Collier. 
Collier (1999) establishes a distinction between greed (“causal factors that are broadly 
consistent with an economic motivation” - economic factors) and grievance when 
describing the causes that might lead rebels into war. However he puts forward the 
idea that it is not easy to determine whether greed or grievance is the rebels driving 
force. Collier says “even where the rationale at the top of the rebel organization is 
essentially greed, the actual discourse might be entirely dominated by grievance” 
because “narratives of grievance play much better with a community than narratives 
of greed, by playing upon a sense of grievance, the rebel organisation may therefore 
be able to add more recruits cheaply”.  
In his model, Collier uses three proxies to capture the notion of the economic agenda 
of the rebels: the importance of exports of primary commodities, the cost of attracting 
recruits to the rebellion and the income-earning opportunities - which he proxies by 
the amount of education in the country. Grievance is proxied by four factors: to which 
extent society is fractionalised by ethnicity or religion, economic inequality, a lack of 
political rights and government economic competence.  
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
Chapter 1	  	  
  Page 29 
The results of contrasting the economic factors with those that proxy grievance are 
overwhelming – says the author, as they confirmed the importance of the economic 
agendas, as opposed to grievance.  
Interestingly enough, Collier finds out that, all other things being equal, a country 
highly dependent on its primary commodity exports (with a quarter of its GDB2 
coming from them) has a four-times greater risk of conflict than a country without 
primary commodity exports. A high number of young men in the society also 
increases the risk of conflict, whereas each additional year of education reduces the 
risk of conflict by around 20 per cent.  
So Collier concludes that a country with large endowment of natural resources, with a 
large number of young males and a low education level is at a higher risk of conflict 
than one with the opposite characteristics.  
Collier also finds that the only result supporting the grievance approach to conflict is 
that each five per-cent block of annual growth has the same effect on the risk of 
conflict as one additional year of education. With all other things equal, a society 
growing at a five per cent rate is around 40 per cent safer than one that is declining by 
five per cent. According to the data, inequality has no impact upon the level of risk of 
conflict, which is quite surprising given that inequality has been used often as a 
reason or source of conflict. However inequality has proved to be significant in 
explaining economic growth. Regarding the political regime operating in the country, 
the results show that a society that is fully democratic is safer than one that is partially 
democratic. However, severe repression proves safer than partial democracy.  
And, last but not least, ethnic and religious fractionalisation reduces the risk of 
conflict significantly. Fractionalised societies are safer than the homogenous ones. 
Therefore, the grievance theory of conflict does not seem to have much support from 
data. Inequality does not prove significant on the level of risk; and political repression 
and ethnic and religious fractionalisation has the opposite effect to what is expected.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 GDB index: Growth and Development Bridge. 
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B - The Connection points between Natural Resources and War 
There is a clear relation between the predatory exploitation of natural resources and 
the violent conflict. Ballentine and Nitzche (2005), identify three connection points:  
1. “The paradox of plenty” or “the resource curse”. In developed countries, natural 
resources are a source of economic development. On the other hand, in developing 
countries, it could be deemed a curse and have detrimental effects on their 
socioeconomic and political stability. Therefore, adequate political responses are 
important in promoting a more equitable economic development and fair trade.  
2. The duration of the conflict, which may depend on the level of revenue 
generated by the predatory exploitation of lucrative natural resources. The highest the 
revenue, the lesser the interest of the elites on terminating the conflict, creating 
barriers or “spoilers” for postconflict peacebuilding.  
3. The moral, legal and political responsibility of the developed countries’ players 
(companies and governments) on the dynamics of the conflict. 
Multiple scholars have found statistical evidence - a strong correlation between the 
state dependence on their natural resources and the likelihood of entering into a civil 
war or, alternatively, the duration of the civil war once it has begun (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998; De Soysa, 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 1999; Ross, 2003). 
Also case studies provide evidence that the existence of natural resources have 
contributed to the inception, duration and intensity of civil wars. Ross (2001) presents 
the analysis of thirteen conflicts between 1994 and 2000 concluding that natural 
resources tend to influence separatist conflicts differently to non-separatist, further 
distinguished by the lootability of the resource. But are all natural resources equally 
likely than others to generate or lengthen civil conflict? 
Ross (2003) addresses this question with the help of a sample of data on which 
resources were involved in a list of civil wars - data extracted from Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998). Table 3 below summarizes information on twelve civil wars by type 
of resource involved.  
Referring to the Table 3, Ross (2003) concludes that the resources most frequently 
linked to conflicts are diamonds and other gemstones (seven conflicts, all of them 
civil wars); oil and natural gas (seven conflicts, six of them civil wars); illicit drugs 
(five conflicts, all of them civil wars); copper or gold (four conflicts, two of them civil 
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wars); and timber (three conflicts, all of them civil wars). Legal agricultural crops 
played a role in two conflicts (both civil wars), although in both cases other natural 
resources played a more important role. 
However, Ross seems unsatisfied with these results and addresses two very 
determinant questions for the understanding of the link between the existence of 
natural resources and armed conflict.  
 
 
Table 3: Conflicts by Resource 
COUNTRIES DURATION TYPE RESOURCES 
AFGHANISTAN 1978-2001 Lootable Gems, opium 
ANGOLA (UNITA) 1975- Both Oil, diamonds 
ANGOLA (CABINDA)1 1975- Unlootable Oil 
BURMA 1949- Lootable Timber, gems, opium 
CAMBODIA 1978-1997 Lootable Timber, gems 
COLOMBIA 1984- Both Oil, opium, coca 
CONGO 1997 Unlootable Oil 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
OF CONGO 
1996-1998 Both Copper, coltan, diamonds, 
gold, cobalt, coffee 
INDONESIA (ACEH) 1975- Unlootable Natural gas 
INDONESIA (WEST PAPUA)1 1969- Unlootable Copper, gold 
LIBERIA 1989-1996 Lootable2 Timber, diamonds, iron, 
palm oil, cocoa, coffee, 
marijuana, rubber, gold 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA1 1988- Unlootable Copper, gold 
PERU 1980-1995 Lootable Coca 
SIERRA LEONE 1991-2000 Lootable  Diamonds 
SUDAN 1983- Unlootable Oil 
  Source Ross (2003) 
Notes: Italic indicates separatist conflict. 
1 The war did not generate 1,000 battle deaths within a one-year period. 
2 Ross (2003) classifies the resources as lootable instead of both because the resources in Liberia were overwhelmingly lootable. 
 
Do civil wars occur more frequently among producers of a common resource (for 
instance oil or drugs) than among non-producers, more frequently among producers 
of a less common resource (for instance timber) than among non-producers? 
Ross points out to the possible subtle causal links between civil wars and natural 
resources that are difficult to observe in case studies, and for that simple reason some 
conflicts might have been excluded from the above table by error.  
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Ross proposes to resolve these questions by observing the rate of dependency of a 
state on the export of a given resource (highly, moderate or minimally dependent). If 
civil war occurs at above-average rate among states that are highly dependent on a 
given resource, this would imply that the resource is tied to the occurrence of the 
conflict. However, this analysis is exceedingly simple in statistical terms and has 
some major limitations. Despite these limitations, the data suggests that:  
1. There is no obvious difference in the civil war rates among the states dependent 
on the analysed categories of natural resources (Oil and Gas, Minerals (does not 
include gemstones), Food Crops and Nonfood Crops).  
2. Higher rates of timber production and export do not appear to be linked to 
higher rates of civil war.  
3. It appears to be a high level of association between civil war and the production 
and export of diamonds and drugs (especially coca and opium).  
Therefore, we can conclude that diamonds and illegal drugs appear to be more 
strongly linked to civil wars than other resources, as for instance timber. Other 
categories such as Oil and Gas, Minerals, Food Crops and Nonfood crops seem to be 
equally tied up to civil war.  
In the second part of his study Ross analyses the impact that the qualities of certain 
resources – especially its susceptibility to low-cost extraction or “looting”- have on 
the incidence and duration of civil wars. Lootable resources (gemstones, agricultural 
crops –including drugs) were strongly associated with civil war in the 1990s and are 
commonly viewed as the most troublesome resources. Ross also concludes that the 
lootable resources also tend to produce more widespread benefits for local people, and 
the poor, than the unlootable resources do.  
As we saw in the previous section, Collier’s model of “greed and grievance”, as Ross, 
also concludes that “lootable resources” or what is the same “exports of primary 
commodities” are highly significant in the level of risk of conflict in a country.  
But why are “lootable resources” so influential? “Lootable resources” are easily 
taxable and, therefore, they are the most heavily taxed component of the GDP of 
developing countries. They are a primary commodity, which can be highly profitable 
as they only depend on the level of natural endowments instead of complicated 
processes in manufacturing. Their production can survive predatory taxation as usually 
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they are originated in rural areas, which can be controlled easily by the rebels. In 
addition to this, taxation on primary commodities has an additional advantage for the 
rebels, as it can be levied in kind, and because they are generic, their source or origin 
is difficult to be identified and therefore is easier to sell them in the international 
market.  
Given that lootable resources are easily taxable, this affects the Government income 
that can be used to promote or finance war and therefore governmental decisions on 
where to allocate public funds. We will see throughout this work the level of 
contagion or interconnection between adjacent wars when the countries compete in the 
same output market.   
In those countries where an armed conflict is active, the labour force might be used 
either for war or the extraction of natural resources. We will analyse in Chapter 2 the 
trade-off between the output and labour markets. We will study the level of motivation 
of Governments to promote war, in countries with precious natural resources, to 
finally find out that a contagion effect exists between adjacent wars and Government 
is better off when more soldiers are recruited. 
We will focus our study in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). DRC has an 
important endowment of Coltan and the exploitation of its precious natural resources 
provides enough funds to finance a civil war, which has killed 5.4 million people so 
far. 
In this political scenario, countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and 
Burundi have been accused of using the revenues from Coltan contraband on 
promoting war in the area.  
Throughout this work we study the interaction of two countries competing in the 
international market, and focus in the natural resources market, especially the Coltan 
market. We analyse the interaction between a productive sector and war activities 
assuming that two countries are the suppliers of an input in the international market. 
Both of them are the users of the domestic labour force, which may be employed in 
two activities: production and war. We study whether and how the strategies followed 
in the domestic market may affect the second market. In a second model, we extend 
our research to study the impact in war activities of Government decisions of 
industrial policy.  
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Although we find extensive research on the relation between natural resources and 
growth, the interaction between the natural resources sector and the labour market; 
and the relation between natural resources and war. Little has been said about the 
triangle of war, natural resources and labour market, which we intend to analyse 
throughout this work.  
5 - ACTIONS TO RESOLVE CIVIL WARS 
A - Policy Tools and Strategies for Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
When reading Ballentine and Nitzche (2005), who, with the support of different 
scholars, provide an extended analysis on the policy tools and strategies that should 
be followed by policymakers in order to tackle all the economic dimensions of the 
armed conflicts, we find that the authors allow for different scholars to present their 
own views on the cause-effect link between natural-resource wealth and armed 
conflict; and the possible policy responses as a mechanism for conflict prevention 
and resolution.  
We then realise the multiple reasons or linkages between the financial outcome of the 
exploitation and trade of the natural resources and the armed conflict. However, we 
will focus on Humphreys (2005), who summarises these in five possible linkages:  
1. Rent seeking: national elites can monopolise the rents obtained by the 
exploitation of natural resources. This can result in three types of conflict:  
a. As we can see in DRC, the rebels use violence to gain control of the 
resource wealth (rents) over the State.   
b. The lack of transparency on the transactions does not allow a real sense 
of how much revenue is generated from the natural resources and therefore is 
commonly associated with corruption. The whole situation is perceived as elites 
selling off the national patrimony and provides rebels with a reason to undertake 
action against the State.  
c. Governments that receive financial support from “unearned income” 
such as revenues from natural resources tend to fail in creating strong institutions and 
therefore are more likely to be exposed to “citizen alienation and violent protest”, as 
we’ve seen in DRC, Zaire and Sierra Leone.  
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2. Grievances: We can find different ways in which the wealth originated by a 
country’s natural resources can originate political grievances ‘that may ultimately turn 
violent”. These grievances are mostly associated with the “mal-distribution” of the 
natural-resource rents, the migratory flows in the production regions and the level of 
security provided in the extraction sites of the production regions. 
3. Economic instability derived from the socio-political distortions associated with 
the high level of dependence of the country on the natural-resource wealth. 
Economies that are highly dependent on natural resources are more vulnerable to the 
effects of trade shocks. The shocks become a source of dissatisfaction on those groups 
highly affected by them and lead to violent opposition to the government. Therefore, 
for effective results, the political strategies must target long-term development plans 
and revenue management.  
4. Conflict financing: even when natural resources may not be the origin of the 
conflict, their exploitation sustains the conflict alive via supporting financially their 
combatants. Therefore, policies need to focus on methods to cut the funding to the 
conflict. This financing comes from the illegal exploitation and illegal activities 
related to the natural resources. However, sanctions are not always successful because 
smugglers and criminals find new ways to develop their activities avoiding the 
sanctions. In order for sanctions to become more effective, these have become more 
“sophisticated”. 
5. Peace spoiling: under circumstances where parties in a conflict gain more 
during wartime than in a period of peace, the likelihood of a longer period of warfare 
increases. The belligerents take advantage of the opportunities of engaging in illegal 
activities that could not be possible during peacetime, either because their actions 
would be considered illegal or because their success depends on their ability to use 
violence. The national policies and international intervention programs (such as the 
ones of the United Nations) to create new employment opportunities, even when 
entail efficiency costs, are proving successful in the promotion of peace. The United 
Nations has applied strategies of disarmament and reintegration in countries such as 
Sierra Leone, where surveys results reveal, “fighters in Sierra Leone saw the 
provision of training and job creation as among the most important items of peace 
negotiations and an important incentive for laying down arms”. However, the 
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dilemma is that to create these “alternative livelihoods” certain levels of investment 
are necessary, which are difficult to achieve in wartime and post-conflict settings due 
to the social, economical and political risks associated. One possible solution to this 
predicament is to encourage and facilitate the involvement of the private sector and 
development planners in peace processes. 
One of the central points of the political debate on conflict resolution is the 
development of “control regimes” aimed at diminishing the self-financing dimension 
of “resource wars” and conflict trade. There have been many policy instruments, 
initiatives and policy mechanisms that have been put into practice to curtail resource 
flows. However, the one that has proven more successful is sanctions on targeted 
commodity and financial sanctions on government elites and rebel groups. Within this 
type falls the so-called “naming and shaming” sanctions that were put into practice in 
DRC successfully as a method to curtail the illegal resource exploitation. Another 
successful initiative is the Kimberley Certificate for rough diamonds, which is fairly 
simple: exporting countries certify their diamonds confirming the stones have been 
obtained legally; importing countries must agree to reject any diamonds without the 
certificate. The Kimberly system intends to tackle the trading diamonds obtained 
illegally, which has been one of the most important sources of the self-financing of 
armed conflicts. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) in 2003 
intended to become the first system to deal with a commodity that has been deeply 
involved in the funding of wars. We can find reports pointing to Al Qaeda laundering 
money via the acquisition of diamonds, which demonstrates the clear links between 
conflict trade and terrorism.  
The success of the KPCS is due mainly not only to the nature of the commodity but 
also to the nature of the industry. The diamond industry is a cartel, leaded by De 
Beers and located principally in Antwerp (Belgium). De Beers and the Belgian 
government were heavily enrolled on the success and implementation of KPCS. Other 
commodities/industries (as the Coltan in DRC – for example) do not have equivalents 
and Governments do not enrol at the same level that the Belgian Government did – a 
key player in the KPCS achievements. KPCS worked not only as a curative but also 
as a preventive measure to ensure illegal trading in diamonds never happens again.  
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Another promising means of curtailing the self-financing of armed conflicts is the 
surveillance of the financial transactions involved in conflict trade. At the moment 
there is no system or anti-money laundering policy that specifically covers a conflict 
dimension or addresses explicitly transactions derived from the illicit trade of natural 
resources or conflict commodities. However, we can find initiatives such as the FATF 
created in 1989, that have developed and implemented international standards to 
combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. FATF has created control 
protocols on the sources of the funds moving through the financial institutions. All the 
financial institutions have the obligation to red-flag and report to their relevant 
authorities any transaction or individual which/who can be a source of concern. Many 
countries have now created laws to avoid the financial markets to be used for money 
laundering and financing of crime/terrorism purposes. The European Union, for 
instance, is part of FATF.  
One of the main sources of concern for FATF at the moment is the “cyber banking”. 
The cyber banks or financial entities that deal primarily in “digital credits” present 
money-launderers and criminals with new opportunities. When a digital credit is 
created, this can be used for any type of transaction without leaving any trace or 
record of it. These types of products have no value limit and “most disturbingly, some 
will allow to be accessed and transferred without the need for financial institution 
intervention”. This means the entire money laundering/tax evasion control/deterrence 
structure put into place by FATF can be evaded.  
Therefore we see as the technology at the reach of criminal networks and 
globalisation are determinant on the shape of the warfare that we have identified in 
previous sections as “new war”, which seems quite difficult to control only 
geographically. These days we see zones of peace and conflict side by side in the 
same territorial space. So we wonder, if it is not possible to deter wars territorially, 
could we achieve it politically? Is it possible to achieve pacification without territorial 
boundaries? Kaldor (2012) contends that every era has a complex relationship 
between processes of governance, legitimacy (which gives the Government power to 
govern) and forms of security and that there is no self-evident answer to the question. 
Today’s main problem is the lack of certainty about future patterns of governance and 
the direction of security policies. 
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B - From peace agreements to peace implementation in civil wars  
We have seen previously different policy tools and mechanisms that can be put into 
practice when seeking peacebuilding and conflict resolution. However, significant 
attention needs to be paid to the major Supranational Institution with powers to 
intervene; this is the United Nations (UN), its main goals being world-peace and 
cooperation.  
The UN was born from the commitment of the WWII allies to extend their alliance to 
ensure economic and social security. The origin of the UN Declaration is the 
Declaration of St. James Palace, signed in June 1941 by the representatives of Great 
Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and of the exiled 
governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and General de Gaulle of France. These are extracts 
from the Declaration, two sentences that still today represent the main goal and 
essence of the United Nations:   
“The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, 
relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security;  
“It is our intention to work together, and with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end.”   
 
By August 14th of that same year, 1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill would issue a declaration what was called the “Atlantic Charter”, where 
they communicated to the world “certain common principles in the national policies 
of their respective countries on which they based their hopes for a better future for the 
world.” 
The eighth clause of the Atlantic Charter states the goal of general security and 
therefore establishes the outline for a system of peacebuilding: 
“They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come 
to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air 
armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of 
their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general 
security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all 
other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of 
armaments.” 
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Twenty-six3 countries signed the United Nations Declaration on January 1st of 1942, 
which meant no other than the adhesion of these countries to the common programme 
of purposes and principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter. 
To this day, out of the 196 countries in the world,  only three remain non-members of 
the UN: Kosovo, Vatican City and Taiwan.  
The level of enrolment of the UN in peace agreements and peace implementation 
programmes in areas of conflict has evolved considerably from the end of the Cold 
War. The United Nations Charter empowers the Security Council to intervene when a 
conflict becomes an international threat or danger for international peace and security. 
Once the Security Council engages in the management of the war it seeks not only to 
end it but also to encourage the parties in the conflict to reach and implement political 
and governance arrangements that can promote and sustain peace in the zone and 
prevent a conflict relapse. 
The way the Security Council operates is by issuing resolutions, which include 
specific demands to the parties in conflict. After the end of the Cold War, the Security 
Council had to readjust its toolbox to the special circumstances of the civil wars and 
their resolutions mostly include demands requesting the parties in the conflict to 
conduct themselves according to a course of action previously agreed in the peace 
agreements. The Security Council also began to issue demands regarding post-conflict 
situations.  
Peace operations became essential when addressing political aspects of the post-
conflict peacebuilding process. 
But how does the Security Council decide on which Civil Wars to engage in? 
Following Cockayne et al. (2010) who present a complete analysis of the level of 
engagement of UN from the year of 1989 to 2006, we see that, despite the level of 
involvement not being constant during this time, there is indeed a heavy engagement 
to civil wars - the Security Council issued 617 resolutions on twenty-seven out of the 
forty-four active conflicts over this period. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  The twenty six original signatories were: the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia. Consecutive adherents to the Declaration were (in order 
of signature): Mexico, Philippines, Ethiopia, Iraq, Brazil, Bolivia, Iran, Colombia, Liberia, France, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, 
Venezuela, Uruguay, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon. 
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Figure 1: Security Council actions on civil wars and post-conflict situations,  
1989-2000. 
 
Source Cockayne, et al. (2010)      
 
Their analysis focuses on variables of the country of the conflict such as location, 
military expenditure, total population, national energy consumption, duration of the 
conflict and fatalities among others. The analysis shows that the Security Council, 
during the period from 1989 to 2006, may have been more inclined to engage in civil 
wars that were taking place in less populous countries, with lower military 
expenditures than 58 per cent of all other states, with marginally lower level of 
economic development, with fewer political rights and fewer civil liberties for their 
citizens than those countries experiencing civil wars where the Security Council did 
not engage. In the light of these conclusions, it seems that the Security Council was 
more likely to intervene in countries with non-democratic civil wars; which is part of 
a broader post-Cold War strategy of encouraging democracy in war-torn countries. 
The effect of the interventions shows that those conflicts addressed by the Security 
Council ended with nine per cent fewer direct fatalities and five years before than 
those conflicts where there was no intervention.  
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The primary focus of the Security Council interventions is the containment of 
spillover effects to other countries and/or provide humanitarian aid to war victims. In 
a more extended view, it also seeks for ending the hostilities and addressing the 
underlying political or economic differences that are the origin of the conflict. In other 
cases, the intervention is only due to the motivation of certain members to be seen as 
“doing something” in response to a burgeoning crisis. 
The Security Council disposes of a diverse and expanding “toolbox” when it comes to 
strategies, the latest additions being targeted sanctions, international criminal 
prosecution and multidimensional peacekeeping. Some of the observed responses of 
the Council when engaging in civil wars, are for instance, the adoption of resolutions 
to reinforce existing or emerging peace processes between the parties in the conflict; 
the establishment of compliance monitoring mechanisms with the Council’s demands 
to the parties in the conflict; the authorisation of peace operations; and the 
implementation of incentives, threats and sanctions.  
Downs and Stedman (2002) present an interesting work on evaluating the issues in 
peace implementation, arriving at certain recommendations for identifying what peace 
agreements UN should implement. The pair examine three issues associated with the 
implementation of peace agreements in civil wars:  
1. The difficulty of estimating the success of individual operations, in order to this 
the authors use certain proxies (“outcome indicators”) as a measure of success, such 
as: mandate achievement, resolution of the underlying conflict, or the level achieved 
on human rights, elections, disarmament and refugee repatriation in the area of 
conflict;  
2. The contextual variables that are associated with the implementation success 
which they identify as: the number of warring parties; the lack of a peace agreement 
before intervention or a coerced peace agreement; the likelihood of spoilers (factions 
or leaders who oppose the peace agreement and use violence to undermine it); a 
collapsed state; the number of soldiers; the presence of valuable and disposable 
natural resources (such as gems, timber or Coltan – among others); the presence of 
hostile neighbouring states or networks; and demands for secession. It appears that the 
variable with a higher level of influence in the level of success when implementing a 
strategy is the extent to which a major or regional power defines a particular case as 
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of interest to national security. Empirical evidence proves that the UN can only 
succeed in the easiest environments when there is an absence of this major or regional 
power interest. 
3. Some of the problems associated with determining and improving the relative 
effectiveness of different implementation strategies that the authors identify as 
strategic misrepresentation and incentive compatibility, which is associated with the 
level of support and willingness of the regional powers. Incentive compatibility 
affects not only the choice of the main strategy but also the availability of 
mechanisms that are necessary to facilitate strategic coherence and coordination. The 
less easy the environment, the higher the need for strategic coordination.  
With this extensive analysis, the authors conclude that, for the UN missions to be 
more effective and for when the UN is selecting what peace agreements to implement, 
UN must invest in intelligence gathering and assess not only the problem/conflict but 
also the elements that will affect the level of success, such as the level of difficulty of 
the case and its environment; the likelihood of the major or regional powers supplying 
the necessary resource given the interests of this major or regional power; the 
identification of implementation spoilers; and the improvement of the UN 
contingency planning for peace missions. And last but not least, when the UN is 
trying to implement a peace agreement in a country with natural resources (spoilers) 
or adjacent to a hostile state to the peace process, the UN should make sure to have 
the strategy, necessary resources and commitment to regulate these commodities and 
the inflow of assistance to the spoilers. 
6 - CONCLUSION  
As we have seen, there is urgency for analysing the entire nature of armed conflicts, 
so politicians and institutions can find effective solutions. We have presented the 
nature of the conflict to be determined by its location and scope; the source of conflict 
- which usually is more than one as we need to take into consideration the different 
agendas of all the parties involved; its status and intensity; and its funding or financial 
dimension.  
But the nature of war is mutant and has evolved over time, Kaldor (2013) establishes 
a clear line between what she defines as the “old wars” and the “new wars”. The end 
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of the Cold War had great impact on the patterns of war as it forced the end of the 
support for the United States and Soviet Union; meaning, in some cases, the origin of 
new civil wars, and in others, creating opportunities for conflict resolution. State 
armies no longer characterise the conflicts of the post-Cold War era; new wars are 
now led by local warlords, paramilitary units, criminal gangs and mercenary groups 
who challenge the authority of the State and financed themselves and the conflict via 
illegal trade in drugs, weapons or natural resources. The “new wars” are now dictated 
by the agendas of the different parties involved (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999), which 
lead to a “new war economy”. Collier finds certain interesting results such as that a 
society growing at a five per cent rate is around 40 per cent safer than one that is 
declining by five per cent. Growth appears to be one of the leading variables to take 
into consideration when assessing actions and policies to promote peace in a conflict 
area. 
Certain conflicts are financially supported by the exploitation of the endowment of 
natural resources, and since the 1990s, scholars have referred to “resource wars” when 
discussing this type of conflict. 
Natural resources might be seen as a source of growth or economic development; 
however, this is true only for the developed countries. Multiple studies such as Ross 
(2001) prove that, in the developing countries, natural resources become a curse that 
has a detrimental effect on their socio-economic and political stability. Hence, the 
importance of finding and implementing adequate political responses to promote a 
more equitable economic development and fair trade.  
“Control regimes” aimed at diminishing the self-financing dimension of resource wars 
and conflict trade have taken the centre of the public debate. Sanctions on targeted 
commodity and financial sanctions on government elites and rebel group have proved 
to be one of the most successful measures. Other alternatives such as the surveillance 
of the financial transactions involved in conflict trade attempt to combat the money-
laundering and the financing of terrorism. However, we see how the technology and 
globalisation have granted to criminal networks the means to breach the controls 
established by local governments, international agreements and institutions.  
Institutions, such as the United Nations, are born with the legitimate goal of ensuring 
economic growth and social security. When the Security Council of United Nations 
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engages in the management of a conflict, it seeks not only to end it but also to 
encourage the parties in the conflict to reach and implement political and governance 
arrangements that can promote and sustain peace in the area and prevent a conflict 
relapse.  
Scholars such as Downs and Stedman (2002) present certain recommendations for the 
United Nations to consider when evaluating peace agreements. Issues such as the 
assessment on the level of success that can be achieved by individual operations, and 
the contextual variables that affect the level of success or the problems associated 
with determining and improving the relative effectiveness of different implementation 
strategies, are some of the suggestions by the authors.  
However, what we feel it is possibly the most important addition and recommendation 
by the authors is that when the UN is trying to implement a peace agreement in a 
country with natural resources (spoilers) or adjacent to a hostile state to the peace 
process, UN should evaluate the strategy and resources necessary to succeed on 
regulating these commodities and inflow of assistance to the spoilers.  
We will discuss in Chapter 3 a modified alternative to the above. Instead of speaking 
about adjacent hostile states to the peace process, we will evaluate the contagion 
effect between adjacent wars. We analyse the dynamics of the armed conflict in two 
countries competing in the Coltan international market, which is defined internally by 
the amount of labour that each country invests in the output industry/mining sector. 
Each country has a given endowment of labour, which must be shared between the 
war and mining activities. 
This is a novel approach to the analysis of the dynamics of  “resource wars”, where 
we focus our attention on the labour input. The “natural resource industry” is labour 
intensive, and so is war. 
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FOREWORD 
“All we know here is that everything that happened was under the influence of the 
international community. If they want to invest in our country, they should no longer 
collaborate with foreign countries and come OFFICIALLY to sign national contracts. 
This way, we will all benefit, and may eat at the same table”  
 
Pascal Ndako 
Former Coltan Negotiator  
Source “In Focus, Congo’s bloody Coltan” documentary 
Produced by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting 
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1 - INTRODUCTION 
As we stated in the previous chapter the lack of social accountability and high level 
of corruption guide countries into unfair and illegal wars, which throw their 
populations deeper into poverty and deep social problems such as human traffic, child 
exploitation and sexual harassment and so on. 
Most of today’s armed conflicts have in common the nature of their self-financing 
entities. The origin of these funds is primarily based on the predatory exploitation of 
the lucrative natural resources of the countries involved, which create sufficient 
revenue to support these “intrastate” wars. The case of DRC is one of the most recent. 
The only hope is to find a quick route to end this violence and those corrupt 
governments supporting illegal wars that have been taking place for years. Mostly, 
they are subsidised by private parties with financial interests.   
Historically, violence has been determinant for the construction of the State and its 
institutions. The monopoly of legitimate violence is the primary condition for the 
existence of the State. This monopoly implies the non-existence of other armed 
powers, which challenge the authority in the territory, and, nowadays, the legitimacy 
implies respect for the human rights.  
The criminal violence operating in many countries has seen the weakness of the State 
and need of institutions. In most of these countries, the security is in the hands of 
institutions inherited from previous authoritarian governments.  
The possible solutions suggested by the international political opinion differ from 
legalisation to taxes/tariffs upon the trade of the illegal products, which, in one or 
another form is used to pay for the violence prevailing in these countries.  
The legalisation, as a “magical solution”, could be just seen as an excuse from the 
Government to “overlook at it” instead of reinforcing the State. As a result, the 
“institutionalization” of crime could appear. As an example, we could point to 
Guatemala, where private armies have three times more men than the State; the rich 
refuse strongly to pay taxes; the police are extremely corrupt; and the criminals 
control extensive territories and during the 1980s, killed more than 100,000 civilians. 
The current Guatemalan government is one of the leaders at international level in 
promoting the legalisation of drugs for instance.  
Therefore, we could say that policy-makers find themselves with a twofold challenge: 
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• To analyse the impact of resource predation and illegal funding on the 
dynamics of the conflict and,  
• Develop efficient policies to prevent or resolve the conflict and promote 
peace. 
The promotion of peace becomes the ultimate goal and the primary challenge when 
defining and implementing policies.  
Economical intervention does not depend only on Government decisions and policies. 
The International independent agencies and the “elite” groups also have a significant 
impact on the economy of an area and how peace can be promoted for the benefit of 
society. Also, companies in the developed world have a moral and even legal 
obligation, which arises from their commercial links with the local war economies. 
Although it is rarely “officially” mentioned, most of the outcome of the “resources 
wars” (a term that has started to be used by scholars to refer to wars mostly financed 
by the exploitation of natural resources) are destined to each consumer markets in the 
so-called “developed world”. Bank secrecy in safe havens of the developed world 
continues to protect the funds of “unclear” origin of certain elites and to facilitate 
money-laundering.  
We will see during this chapter how the United States (US) Government and OECD 
have tried to implement measures4 or solutions to bring transparency and due 
diligence into the trade of minerals such as tantalum (Coltan), gold, tin and tungsten. 
Both entities intend to raise corporate responsibility awareness (Joseph-Gabriel, 
2015) among the companies operating in the DRC market, since these companies are 
partly responsible for the abuse of human rights and the conflict in the area.  
The chapter is divided in four sections. Our next section is Section 2, a general 
overview of the political and economical environment in DRC, where we present 
from an objective perspective the evolution of the country from 1959, when the 
country emerged from the Belgian colonial rule to the present.  
Section 3 presents the Coltan business in DRC, what it means for the country and the 
use of Coltan to finance the current conflict. It is also in this section where we present 
certain international measures to provide transparency in the Coltan trade, which have 
been undertaken by the US Government and the OECD – we refer to the Dodd-Frank 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  PWC (2014). In Brief: SEC issues guidance on conflict minerals disclosures.	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Act section 1502 by the US Government and the Due Diligence Guide by OECD 
(2013). 
In Section 4, we present our conclusions. 
 
2 - A REAL WORLD CASE: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
Democratic Republic of Congo was known until 1997 as Zaire. It is a country located 
in Central Africa, sharing borders with Congo, Central Africa Republic, South 
Sudan, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, United Republic of Tanzania and 
Zambia, as per figure 2 below. Geographically the country is located in a landlocked 
area, which leaves it partly isolated due to its low level of infrastructure. 
Surrounding conflicts are still alive in Central African Republic (of medium 
intensity) and South Sudan (of high intensity) - please refer to Chapter 1 for further 
detail on the definition of the measurement of the intensity of the conflict. 
 
Figure 2: Democratic Republic of Congo political map.  
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DRC has a population around 70 million, with the lowest per capita GDP according 
to International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is the eighteenth most populous nation in 
the world and the fourth in Africa. The malnutrition affects approximately two-thirds 
of the country´s population and we can find sharp social and economic inequalities 
between its provinces and among its rural and urban areas. The Government has 
launched a medium-term plan to improve the infrastructure of the country, which 
will mean better links and connection between areas and should become a source of 
growth. 
 Violence has plagued DRC since its emergence from the Belgian colonial rule in 
1959. In 1965, after the assassination of the Independence leader Patrice Lumumba 
(first president elected democratically), General Joseph Mobutu consolidated his 
power supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium. Mobutu 
gave to the country three decades of dictatorship during which time he amassed a 
vast personal wealth. Mobutu’s power overcame the challenges of the rebellion of 
1967 and insurrections of 1977 and 1978, thanks to the financial support of his 
patrons, the United States, France and Belgium (Schatzberg, 1991). In 1997, with the 
refugee crisis initiated after the Rwandan genocide and after decades of human 
rights’ abuses, deep poverty, high level of corruption and lack of social and 
governmental accountability, Mobutu’s dictatorship came to an end. Laurent Kabila 
took power, supported militarily by Uganda and Rwanda, financially backed by the 
American Mineral Fields and ethnically upheld by the Tutsi Katangans and Mai Mai. 
Kabila was assassinated in 2001. At present, his son Joseph Kabila presides over the 
country. 
The Second Congo War began in 1998, after Kabila cut ties with his former patrons 
Rwanda and Uganda. The two countries, along with Burundi and financial support 
from the United States, IMF and World Bank, then invaded DRC in support of the 
anti-Kabila rebels. Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and the hutus and mai-mai 
militias responded by sending troops in defence of the DRC State.  
The UN sent a mission with more than 5,000 peacekeepers to implement 
peacebuilding strategies. However, the result was not successful.  
This war has been the biggest conflict since World War II, and fighting still 
continues in the east of the country where the prevalence of rape and other sexual 
violence is described as the worst in the world, killing 5.4 million people up until 
now.  
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Since 1999, all efforts by the UN to support the ceasefire have not achieved the 
expected results, despite the repeated appeals by Ban Ki-moon and his predecessor 
Kofi Annan to the international parties for more funding. Countries such as the 
United States have claimed that the bill is already too expensive and, therefore, the 
conflict is still active.  
Despite the undesirable economic situation of its citizens, DRC is a nation endowed 
with vast natural resources. Nevertheless, since the conflict began, the national 
output and government revenue have dramatically declined, external debt has 
increased, and the population situation is untenable. 
Some controversial reports such as the ones by the UN and RAID5 (2004) point to 
the exploitation of Congo’s precious natural resources such as diamonds, gold, 
uranium, petroleum and Coltan as the main funding activities of the conflict. The 
Congolese economy is mainly based on the mining sector, and therefore it could play 
an important role in improving living conditions in DRC but the domestic political 
elite has failed to take action, probably, because of the western countries’ 
unwillingness to commit to solving the conflict, given the economic and geopolitical 
interests.  
As said above, at the present, the economy of the DRC is mainly based on the 
exploitation of precious minerals as Coltan (80% of Coltan world resources are 
located in DRC). This export of mined Coltan requires traders. A Belgian company, 
Cogecom Sprl, obtained a granted monopoly on all Coltan exports in 2000. Corrupt 
officials and traffickers through neighboring countries carry out the rest of the illegal 
Coltan exports. So, the path of Coltan to reach the rest of the world is a highly 
convoluted one, where legitimate mining operations are mixed with illegal rebel 
ones. 
The African Development Bank (AFDB) has reported a 9% growth in 2014, driven 
specially by the extractive and manufacturing industries, agriculture, commerce and 
construction, and helped by a strong external demand and high raw material prices. 
However, there is no improvement in the country’s social indicators because only 
certain sectors have shown growth but with very little job creation. The unstable 
political climate and low level of security still continues and is a source of continuing 
vulnerability for the country. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 RAID: Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) is a charity that advocates for binding corporate accountability 
frameworks, particularly the development of international norms on the human rights responsibilities of companies.  
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Therefore the challenge for the Government and its population is to engage in a 
development process that helps the country to get out of its fragile situation. 
The AFDB gives the following recommendations to improve the population’s living 
conditions:  
1. Strengthening of governance and consolidation of peace. 
2. Economic diversification, acceleration of growth and employment promotion. 
3. Improved access to basic social services and building human capital. 
4. Environmental protection and climate-change control. 
Despite the efforts of the Government, the private sector and society, the country is 
still far from reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). DRC shows high 
level of poverty, large development disparities mainly due to the slow 
decentralisation process and low level of infrastructure.  
The Millennium Goals were agreed at the Millennium Summit in September 2000. 
The largest gathering of world leaders ever committed their nations to a new global 
partnership to reduce extreme poverty and set up economic and social targets to be 
accomplished by 2015. These goals are now known as the MDG. These are the main 
goals:  
1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty.  
2. Achieve universal primary education. 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women. 
4. Reduce child mortality. 
5. Improve maternal health. 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability. 
8. Develop a global partnership for development. 
In an attempt to allow the DRC population to share their views on development, the 
UN Secretary undertook a program of national consultations via a national survey 
from December 2012 to mid-May 2013. The consultations involved 50 to 80 people 
per province from all areas and social strata and among heterogeneous socio-
professional groups. The analytical report was issued on September 18, 2013, during 
a workshop attended by politicians, bureaucrats and general members of the civil 
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society with the aim of helping to develop new initiatives that foster the growth and 
development that the country and its population are hoping for. 
These are some of the statistics reported for 2014 by UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program) as per Table 4 below:  
 
 
Table 4: UNDP indicators and values. 
 
INDICATORS VALUES 
Life expentancy at birth (years) 48.7 
Infant mortality rate (per 100 births) 17% 
Gross rate of school enrolment (girls/boys)1 54% 
Literacy rate (15 years +) 66.8% 
Mobile telephone penetration rate 18% 
Rainforest (second place after Brazil) 55% 
Forest Reserve (million hectares), or 48% of the 
rainforest of Africa and 3% of the world’s 
forests 
210 
Congo river (Km), fifth longest river in the 
world after the Nile, the Amazon, the 
Mississippi and the Yangtze. But second in 
terms of flow, after the Amazon 
4,700 
River and lake network (thousands of Km) 25 
Roads (thousands of Km)  140 
Infrastructure (aerodromes, including five 
international airports) 
175 
                   Source  UNDP.  
 
In the last ranking published by UN regarding the HDI (Human Development Index), 
DRC was 186th out of 188 countries, with a HDI value of 0.338 compared to the 
0.944 of Norway –the first country in the ranking.  
The HDI is a geometric mean of normalised indices for three dimensions: a long and 
healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. It was 
created by UN to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the main 
criteria to assess the level of development of a country instead of considering only 
the economic growth. 
The life expectancy at birth is used as a proxy to compute the health dimension. The 
standard of living is measured by the gross national income per capita. And the 
education component is measured following the values provided by the UNESCO for 
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the mean years of schooling, which is calculated based on enrolment by age at all 
levels of education.  
We are seeing how the Congolese Government is working on reforms at 
macroeconomic level to reach a sustainable level of growth and development. 
However, there is still a long way ahead to reach the MDG, and the Government, its 
institutions and society in general remain fragile and under recovery from a long 
period of instability and conflict. The country needs to continue working towards a 
sustainable growth in partnership with the private sector and international 
community. It is key to restore peace in order to foster development and investment. 	  
3 – THE COLTAN BUSINESS  
 
Coltan, short for Columbite-Tantalite, was an unknown resource until the end of the 
last century, but became a very well known input when the technological industry 
changed into one of the most profitable businesses for the western countries. As per 
Figure 3 below, the Coltan moves around the globe, from DRC to East Asia and the 
Western countries, through the different stages of its life-cycle. 
 
Figure 3: Coltan Life-Cycle 
 
         Source Congo Forum  
 
Coltan is mainly mined in Australia, Canada, Brazil, Mozambique and Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). However, DRC differs from the rest of the producers in 
its fragile state and high level of corruption. In 2014, DRC was ranked 154th out of 
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175 countries in the Corruption Perception Index6, by Transparency International. 
Mining is an artisanal activity controlled by rebel and elite groups linked to 
multinational companies operating in the country, which have fallen into bad 
business practices out of the international and governmental surveillance.  
This metallic ore is a basic input in the production of mobile phones, computer game 
consoles, jet engines, ballistic missiles and nuclear reactors among others. Its 
importance for the hi-tech industry is demonstrated by the fact that Coltan mining is 
the best-paid activity in the country. An average Congolese worker makes $10 per 
month, while a Coltan miner can make from $10 to $50 a week.  
Despite the fact that there are other reserves of Coltan are in Africa, in Australia or 
the Americas, most of the Coltan traded in the world has been extracted in DRC 
(please see Table 5 on page 59 for more details on Coltan-mining countries). What is 
the reason for this?  
The reasons are basically economical. It is far cheaper for any multinational to set 
itself up in DRC than in any other country, given the low level of governmental 
control, higher level of corruption and near-inexistent labor laws, which, evidently, 
minimise the set-up and operating costs. 
An additional reason is that some countries as China have imposed different barriers 
to trade such as export tariffs and export quotas, targeting the protection of their 
national reserves, which conserve their resources and give preference to the national 
producers. The case is still on-going in the World Trade Organization (WTO) after 
United States, the European Union and Japan accused China of the violation of 
international trade rules by imposing quotas on earth minerals (such as Coltan).  
Countries as Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Burundi have been accused 
of smuggling Coltan from DRC and using the revenues generated from the high price 
of Coltan to sustain their efforts in the war. The Rwandan Army obtained at least 
$250 million in a period of 18 months through Coltan sales, even though no Coltan is 
mined in Rwanda. All these countries defend themselves by stating they exploit their 
own resources. The Rwandan government said it was extracting 1,440 tonnes of 
Coltan per year from its own mines. This contradicts the UN report, which shows 
official Rwandan government statistics of Coltan production revealed they mined 83 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A 
country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean). A country or territory's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries and territories in the index (Transparency 
International, 2015) 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
Chapter 2 
 Page 58 
tons per year. In an additional report, the UN states that the APR (Armée Patriotique 
Ruandés) has established an ad-hoc structure to supervise and control the DRC 
mining activity and facilitate contracts with the European and Occidental companies. 
The report also claims that different companies have been created in partnership 
between European and American Coltan negotiators and members from the circle of 
the Rwandan president Paul Kagame in order to manage Coltan sale and distribution 
worldwide. 
The subject of the interest of neighbouring countries on keeping alive the conflict 
was discussed by Downs and Stedman (2002) who conclude that when UN is trying 
to implement a peace agreement in a country with natural resources (spoilers) or 
adjacent to a hostile state to the peace process (as mentioned above, DRC’s situation 
with Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbawe and Burundi), the UN should make sure to 
have the strategy, necessary resources and commitment to regulate these 
commodities and the inflow of assistance to the spoilers. 
For the UN missions to be more effective and when the UN is selecting what peace 
agreements to implement, UN must invest in intelligence gathering and assess not 
only the problems/conflict but als the elements that will affect the level of success 
such as the level of difficulty of the case and its environment; the likelihood of the 
major or regional powers supplying the necessary resource given the interests of this 
major or regional power; the identification of implementation spoilers; and the 
improvement of the UN contingency planning for peace missions.  
Before any intervention, the UN needs to assess the economic and political interests 
involved. When examining the causes of the DRC conflict, the UN needs not only to 
concentrate on the DRC supply of natural resources and demand for arms and 
weapons but also to consider the demand for natural resources and arms supply from 
the developed countries – generally these arms are produced in the permanent five 
(P-5)7 members of UN. Therefore, UN decisions on intervention are most often 
subordinated to the interests of the P-5. 
Regarding the actions by International bodies and Governments to control the trade 
of illegally mined minerals in DRC, we find special measures taken by the USA and 
the OECD. However, the results are still to be evaluated since both are quite new.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The five permanent members of UN are China, France, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
Chapter 2 
 Page 59 
In the US, Barack Obama signed on July 21, 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act which relates to corporations and conflict 
minerals.  On August 22nd 2012, the U.S.A. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) issued the final rule to implement the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires 
companies to disclose their use of conflict minerals (tantalum, tin, gold and 
tungsten). The rule was approved because of the concerns of the US Government 
over the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals being used by armed groups to 
finance the conflict still alive in DRC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Factsheet, 2014).  
June 2, 2014 was the first deadline for companies to submit their information to 
comply with the Conflict Mineral Rule. The rule requires issuers to disclose whether 
their products contain minerals “DRC conflict free”, have “not been found to be 
“DRC conflict free”, or are “DRC conflict undeterminable”. The requirement to 
report whether any of the products has “not been found to be “DRC conflict free” 
was seen to violate the First Amendment by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court upheld the rest of the Rule. 
The OECD also revealed the corporate responsibility of companies associated with 
extracting, trading, handling and exporting minerals from conflict-affected and high 
risk-areas. The OECD published in 2011 the “Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas” backed by the Governments of the eleven members of the Great Lakes 
Conference8 and UN. The guide raises awareness on the impact of their actions of the 
local communities, being at risk of contributing to human rights abuse and conflict. 
The guide is structured around a five-step framework defined as:  
1. Establish strong company management systems. 
2. Identify and assess risk in the supply chain. 
3. Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks. 
4. Carry our independent third-party audit of supply-chain due diligence at 
identified points in the supply chain. 
5. Report on supply-chain due diligence. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 	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This guide, not legally binding, invited companies to set up an easy due-diligence 
protocol on their supply-chain to implement good practices in the minerals trade; by 
companies assessing the risks associated with their activities and relations.  
However, different parties and scholars have questioned the outcome of these two 
measures, the Conflict Mineral Rule and the OECD guidance. Seay (2012) argues 
that the Dodd-Frank 1502 Act, even when well intentioned, has already had 
unintended consequences that harm those it was meant to help. The rule has actually 
contributed to a boycott on Congolese minerals. Due to the high level of uncertainty 
and lack of regulation in the country, companies cannot deliver what they are asked 
for by the ruling and have reacted by pulling out of the Congolese market place.  
Nowadays, the Coltan route is a convoluted one that, despite the current efforts of the 
International Community, needs a coordinated action from the Government, its 
institutions, the Congolese private sector and the International Community to ensure 
it becomes a source of growth instead of a source of conflict, as it is still today.  
4 - CONCLUSION 
We have presented in the previous chapter the model of Greed and Grievance by 
Collier (1999 & 2004), which offers a very useful starting-point for a discussion 
about the commercial or economic motivations in a civil war context. Collier asserts 
“even when the rationale at the top of the rebel organization is essentially greed, the 
actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievance”… “Narratives of 
grievance play much better with a community than narratives of greed, and by 
playing upon a sense of grievance, the rebel organization may therefore be able to 
add more recruits cheapily.” 
Therefore, when the conflict is active, resource accumulation becomes paramount 
and part of a “vicious circle in which war has become a business, and business is 
used to wage war” (Raeymaekers, 2002). The interests of the rebels who control the 
natural resources and the interests of transnational criminal enterprises are 
complementaries, since the latter can provide the distribution, transportation and 
marketing necessary to place the natural resources in the global consumer markets. 
As Naylor (1993) says, “any insurgency using the international black market to 
finance its activities inevitably forms mutually profitable and likely quite durable 
relations with international criminal groups”. Transnational crime organisations 
provide an additional service as arms suppliers. Sometimes, this armed trade is based 
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on barter arrangements (Williams and Picarelli, 2005) because of the advantages for 
both parties. Barter arrangements allow the rebels to have an easier and cheaper 
access to arms since they don’t require up-front financing, and the criminal enterprise 
obtains a considerable opportunity for profit-making; for example, the arms dealers 
Viktor Bout and Sanjivan Ruprah obtained special concessions on Coltan and 
diamonds in DRC (Bagley, 2004): 
Bout’s actions bring to light the “strong connection that exists between occupying 
armies, mineral businesses and the regional proliferation of arms. While he has been 
supplying most of the warring parties with military equipment, his close relations to 
regional commodity traders has assured him of his involvement in the exploitation of 
precious resources such as Coltan and diamonds. In turn, the trade in these resources 
has provided the military actors with their necessary cash flows to secure their 
power”. 
It is this complicated puzzle of interests that sets up the different economic agendas to 
which Collier (1999) was referring as a primary motive for warfare. Collier contests 
that economic agendas are central to understanding why civil wars start, as conflicts 
are more likely to happen because of economic opportunities than by grievance. 
Those groups that benefit from the conflict – even when they are a minority - will feel 
motivated to initiate it and sustain it, despite the conflict destroying economic 
opportunities for the majority. 
The political and economic disruptions caused by civil wars set the ground for the 
rebels and elites to obtain their goals more easily. The informal economy facilitates 
informal transactions and loose trade networks that provide the necessary clandestine 
cover. Usually, the main players in the economic activities are linked to the civil war 
protagonists.  
In the former Zaire (DRC), there were four major trading routes used by belligerents 
and neighbouring countries to export “fraudulently” natural resources mostly looted 
from DRC. Agricultural and manufactured products were transferred via Kampala in 
Uganda. Goods and people were transported via Bujumbura in Burundi. Coffee, 
precious materials, manufactured goods and foreign currencies were sent via the 
Oriental Province of Congo to Uganda and from there to Nairobi and Dubai. The 
fourth major route was via Dar-es-Salam in Tanzania by railway. The profits of this 
informal trade were reported to go to a private bank, specifically set up in Dar-es-
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Salam (Tanzania), with the only purpose of laundering the earnings from this illegal 
trade of natural resources. 
Currently these routes have become extremely dangerous, controlled by rebel armies 
who force any trader willing to use them to fall upon their rules and cooperate either 
with cash payments, foods, clothes etc in return for personal security. These 
businessmen become sponsors of the rebels and financial supporters of the conflict. 
In DRC, the warring groups and the informal traders coexist in a very complex way.  
However, the multiple agendas from the different groups taking part in a conflict are 
difficult to determine. By definition, civil war means the use of force against the 
Government by its opponents. The Government contends the “illegality” of the 
conflict based on the violation of internationally accepted principles that the 
international community usually endorses. Per contra, the rebels defend the illegal 
character of the State and its lack of legitimacy as the reasons to enter into warfare. 
In certain cases, private parties become central actors of the conflict benefiting from 
their support to one or other side, rebels or Governments. The economic agendas of 
all parties involved in the conflict are mutant and change as the war progresses.  
Nevertheless, even if it were possible to determine the economic agendas of the 
different parties for the pursuit of their economic gains, we still face the challenge of 
determining the true total volume of the economic transactions carried out informally 
(Mwanasali, 2000), mostly because of the difficulty of monitoring these informal 
transactions in the local markets. Therefore, when assessing the economic situation in 
the conflict zone, we cannot just rely on the macroeconomic indicators offered up by 
the Government, international agencies or any other type of organization, as these do 
not reflect the reality. 
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FOREWORD 
We say therefore War belongs not to the province of Arts and Sciences, but to the 
province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests, which is settled by bloodshed, 
and only in that is it different from others. It would be better, instead of comparing it 
with any Art, to liken it to business competition, which is also a conflict of human 
interests and activities; and it is still more like State policy, which again, on its part, 
may be looked upon as a kind of business competition on a great scale. Besides, State 
policy is the womb in which War is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a 
rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their germs. 
 
       General Carl von Clausewitz, 1874 
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1 - INTRODUCTION  
In our previous chapters, we have studied the evolution of armed conflicts and we have 
discussed the tight relation between war and financial interests. We have seen how 
countries with an important endowment of natural resources fund their wars with the 
outcome from the trade of these. Many authors have already pointed to the many 
similarities between warfare and business competition, sharing even certain expressions 
such as “warlike conditions”, “casualties” or “conflict”, for instance.  
Carl von Clausewitz already noted in the nineteenth century that business was a form of 
human competition that greatly resembled war. Under this statement, we could think of 
many questions, but maybe one of the oldest and most controversial among political 
scientists is: 
What is the cause-effect relation between war and trade? 
From a theoretical standpoint and depending on which school we stick to, we may defer 
from the idea that trade promotes peace (liberal school) to that asymmetric trade drives 
to conflicts (neo-marxist school). Please refer to Barbieri and Schneider (1999), or 
Kapstein (2003), for more recent studies. A remarkable exception is the paper by Glick 
and Taylor (2005), who study the opposite causal link from war to trade. 
Contrary to what one could think, many of the poorest countries of the world are rich in 
natural resources such as oil, gas and other minerals. Nevertheless, the lack of social 
accountability and high level of corruption of their governments guide these countries 
into unfair and illegal wars that send their populations further into poverty. 
Corruption undermines trade and the economic development by discouraging direct 
investment and new small businesses from establishing within the country because of 
the high “start-up costs” required due to corruption. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) 
argue that corruption and imperfect contract enforcement reduce international trade 
dramatically; they also find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs 
do. 
Specifically, transnational organised crime such as drug, firearms, human trafficking and 
money-laundering among others, is considered as one of the biggest threats for the 
social, economical and cultural development of societies.  
NGOs and other international bodies such as the United Nations dedicate a large share 
high level of their budgets to create control instruments and shed light on the political 
and economical situation of third-world countries, targeting more transparency in their 
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government and therefore in the flow of revenues from oil, gas and mining companies to 
the State.  
Different lines of research have been developed on the study of the level of success of 
control policies on industries with “illegal or non-desirable” products. 
Researchers such as Stimming (1999), Anderson and Bandiera (2005) and United 
Nations (2003) among others have shown their interest in these lines of investigation.  
Stimming (1999), for example, presents in a differential game between two symmetrical 
firms; provided with a clean and dirty production activity, he analyses of how 
investment and emissions are affected by environmental regulation. His conclusion is 
that each firm’s investment levels increase with a stricter environmental policy towards 
its rival, which causes more emissions by this firm. On the other hand, Anderson and 
Bandiera (2005) study why state policies to disrupt or reduce illegal trade usually fail or 
do not obtain the expected result. Their proposal of a simple model of trade outside the 
law preyed on by robbers and possibly protected by private robbers conclude that safety 
in numbers has important implications for the existence of trade and for the success of 
state policies against illegal trade. Anderson (2015) analyses if bigger markets are safer 
and how governmental policies should respond to terrorist threats.   
Our paper suggests a third line of study, a theoretical framework for analysing the 
interaction between a productive sector and the war activities in a context of 
international duopolistic competition. 
This theoretical framework is also used to develop an analysis of a real case - the Coltan 
market vs war activities in Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. 
Coltan is a mineral labelled as metallic ore for the technological industry. Its importance 
is such that it is the best-paid activity in the producer countries. In average a Congolese 
miner makes four to five times more money than any other regular Congolese worker. 
Countries such as Rwanda have been accused of using the revenues generated from the 
high price of Coltan to sustain their efforts in the war.   
Our study analyses the interaction between a productive sector and war activities, 
assuming that two countries are the suppliers of an input in the international market. 
Both of them are the users of the domestic labour force, which may be employed in two 
activities: production and war.  
We study whether the strategies followed in the domestic market may affect the second 
market.  
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The analysis begins in section 2a following the line of Bulow et al. (1985).9  
We firstly assume that a monopolist decides to compete in a second market with other 
firm (duopolist). Secondly, we imagine there is a positive shock (decrease in tax) in the 
domestic market of the monopolist. We wonder which strategy the duopolist will decide 
to follow within this scenario. 
We find out that the strategies of each firm are defined depending on whether 
competitor’s products are strategic substitutes10 or strategic complements, which are 
defined below, but we can provide a rough explanation now: conventional substitutes 
and complements can be differentiated by whether a more “aggressive” strategy put in 
place by firm 1 (or country A) increases or decreases firm 2´s total profits or 
analogously firm 2´s marginal profits (or country B). 
We conclude that, when products are substitutes and the shock is positive, the 
monopolist opts to sell more so the duopolist must play less aggressively. After this 
conclusion, we decide to extend our model to both firms competing in both countries, 
and we assume there is a civil war taking place in each country, which is financed by the 
tax on profits.  
As we have seen in our previous chapters, wars financed by the State were typical until 
the twentieth century when armed conflicts began to become more complicated and 
more global, and it is not enough to contain them geographically as the consequences of 
the conflict extend outside their borders. It is what Kaldor (2012) defines as the “new 
war”, what we have discussed at length in Chapter 1. 
According to our model, an increase in war activities in country A will cause war in 
country B if produces the strategic complementarity, relation suggests that national 
and/or supranational authorities must take into account this phenomenon of war 
contagion when any regulatory decision is implemented.  
Our models also capture the fact that war is possible because it is supported by the 
profits of the producers. We assume that producers dedicate a percentage X of their 
profits to finance war activities. In our model, the Government decides this unilaterally. 
This implies an optimal 𝑟 (where 𝑟 is the tax on profits established by the government), 
which exists because an excessively high tax will discourage producers from producing 
and therefore the war will not have the funds needed.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Bulow and Geanokoplos (1983) analyse in terms of a perfect Nash equilibria of Cournot-type game in which two identical firms must 
choose between cheap and expensive production in each of two periods. 
10 Brander (1981) argues that the usual approach to intra-industry trade is to assume that such trade arises because slightly different 
commodities are produced and traded to satisfy consumer's tastes for variety. However Brander demonstrates that there are reasons to 
expect two-way trade even in identical products, due to strategic interaction among firms. 
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The aforementioned situation means that “the input market” has two externalities over 
this parallel labour market, which we label as “war”:  
A positive one, because higher profits of the input producer imply higher investment of 
capital in the “war” sector.  
A negative one, because the greater the labour recruited in the productive sector, the 
higher the wage in the labour market from which war also recruits soldiers. 
Thus we study a two-stage game in section 2b, which will be solved using backward 
induction.  
Firstly, we will focus on the equilibrium in the international duopoly, taking war 
activities in each market as a given. Secondly, we will calculate the government value Vi 
due to the employment levels obtained in the Nash equilibrium at the first-stage.  
In section 3 we extend our model. The Government now applies two taxes, not just 𝑟  (tax on profits) but also 𝛾, which is a tax on the output.  
Under these scenarios, we analyse how producers will react to the Governmental 
decisions of applying different levels of taxes and if the Government is more motivated 
on the promotion of war (hiring more soldiers) or the promotion of peace (hiring fewer 
soldiers). 
As we mentioned above, several of the elements of the model are closely designed to 
capture features of a real-world example, based on the case of the Coltan mining sector 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, which we have seen in our previous 
chapter. 
2 - MODEL 1:  
Analysis of the interaction between war activities and the productive sector 
There are studies dealing with the relationship between military conflicts and trade from 
theoretical and empirical points of view. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2007) test the 
effect of trade on the probability of military conflict and conclude that regional and 
bilateral trade agreements, which foster regional and bilateral trade flows, may have 
positive consequences for political relations. They show that, even in a model where trade 
increases welfare and war is Pareto dominated by peace, higher trade flows may not lead 
to peace. The authors suggest that the intuition that trade promotes peace may be only 
partially right because bilateral trade increases the opportunity cost of bilateral war; 
indeed, it deters bilateral war. However multilateral trade openness has a different effect 
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on the opportunity cost of bilateral war and it increases the probability of war between 
any given pair of countries, given that it weakens the incentive to make concessions 
during negotiations.  
Our model follows the line marked by Bulow et al. (1985) who analysed how the 
strategies of a competitor in a second market change when a firm affects its own marginal 
costs in the first market. Two factors will determine whether the changes in the 
competitor´s strategies will result in higher or lower profits: a) both markets exhibit joint 
economies or diseconomies; and b) the relation between the products of both competitors, 
whether they are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Basically, strategic 
substitutes and complements are defined by whether a more “aggressive” strategy by firm 
1 lowers or raises firm 2´s marginal profits.  
A - The Simplest Model of Strategic Relationships across different domains 
As stated above, based on the analysis developed by Bulow et al. (1985), we may run an 
analysis about the effect of one firm strategies on the strategies of the other. 
We wonder how much the profit of firm 1 would be affected if its profitability is 
increased in market A. The result will depend on the level of change of firm 2´s strategy 
in that market.  
Let´s create the simplest model of analysis of strategic effects, assuming that we have two 
firms, firm 1 and 2; in two countries, country A and B. Firm 1 is a monopolist in country 
A and firm 2 is a duopolist with firm 1 in country B. 
The demand function in the international market is defined as 𝑃 = 𝐷(𝑄)  where 𝑄 = 𝑄! + 𝑄!. 
According to a production function 𝑄! = 𝑓 𝑙!"  where 𝑙!" is the level of workers chosen 
as strategic variable by each firm j in country i, ∀  𝑗 = 1, 2  and  𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵. Therefore, a 
higher level of workers used by a firm means a “more aggressive” play.  
We can assume in market A that 𝑙!! = 𝑞!! = 𝑄! because, as a monopolist in market A, 
firm 1 will be choosing its quantity. Similarly, 𝑙!! + 𝑙!! = 𝑞!! + 𝑞!! = 𝑄!. 
Finally, we imagine there is a shock in market A, defined as a decrease in 𝑟 (the 
government collects 𝑇! = 𝑟𝜋! as a tax on profits). Equivalently, it can be interpreted as 
either shifting firm 1´s marginal revenue curve (as a function of quantity) in country A 
upward by one unit or shifting its marginal cost curve downward by one unit.  
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We may analyse then the effect on the marginal profitability of a firm, as regards the 
strategy followed by its competitor.  
As we have stated in Chapter 2, in year 2000, a Belgian company called Cogecom Sprl 
obtained a granted monopoly in DRC on all Coltan exports. Therefore, the rest of all 
Coltan exports are illegal and carried out by corrupt officials and traffickers. Cogecom 
enjoys a leading position in the market, and its decisions affect other markets.   
We define the profit of firm 1, a monopolist in market A, 𝜋!! , as:     𝜋!   𝑙!!, 𝑙!! , 𝑙!! , 𝑟 = 𝜋!! 𝑙!! + 𝜋!! 𝑙!! , 𝑙!! − 𝐶! 𝑙!!, 𝑙!! , 𝑙!! + 𝑟𝑙!!                        (1)  
Because, as previously said, 𝑙!" = 𝑞!" ,∀  𝑗 = 1, 2  and  𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵. 
Firm 2 is a duopolist since it competes in market B with firm 1, its profit is defined as: 𝜋!     𝑙!! , 𝑙!! = 𝜋!! 𝑙!! , 𝑙!! − 𝐶! 𝑙!! , 𝑙!!                                                                     (2) 
If the profit functions are all differentiable, then we have three first-order conditions 
(FOC), which must be satisfied, at an interior Nash equilibrium: !!!!!!! =    !!!!!!!! −    !!!!!!! + 𝑟 = 0                                                                                              (3) !!!!!!! =    !!!!!!!! −    !!!!!!! = 0                                                                                                     (4) !!!!!!! =    !!!!!!!! −    !!!!!!! = 0                                                                                                     (5) 
To analyse the effect of a shock (decrease in “𝑟”), which makes market A more 
profitable, we differentiate the FOC: !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! +    !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! +    !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! + !!!!!!!!!" 𝑑𝑟 = 0                                        (6) !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! +    !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! +    !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! + !!!!!!!!!" 𝑑𝑟 = 0                                        (7) !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! +    !!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑙!! = 0                                                                                     (8) 
If we simplify these equations further !!!!" = 𝑞!!; therefore, !!!!!!!!!" = 1. 
Since, 𝑙!! = 𝑞!! and !!!!!!!!!" =    !"!!!!!! = 0; equations (3), (4) and (5) may be summarised as !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!0 !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!
∙ 𝑑𝑙!!𝑑𝑙!!𝑑𝑙!! = −𝑑𝑟00                                                         (9) 
We can make the following assumptions: 
ASSUMPTION 1: 
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The equilibrium is strictly stable, and then the determinant 𝜋 < 0 in (9); this means that 
in the absence of market A, market B would still be strictly stable, 𝜋!!𝜋!! > 𝜋!"𝜋!" 
what means that !!!!!!!!!!!! ∙ !!!!!!!!!!!! > !!!!!!!!!!!! ∙ !!!!!!!!!!!! 
ASSUMPTION 2: 
The products are substitutes, !!!!!!! < 0  and !!!!!!! < 0. 
We can now resolve (9): 
1. !!!!!" > 0 A positive shock11 to the marginal profitability of market A causes 1 to 
sell more. 
2. ± !!!!!" = ± !!!!!!!!!!!!  
Therefore, under a positive shock, the monopolist firm 1 will adopt a more aggressive 
strategy in its domestic market when a decrease in “𝑟” takes place. Nevertheless the 
strategy followed by firm 1 in market B will be defined whether markets A and B exhibit 
joint economies (more aggressive) or joint diseconomies (less aggressive).  
 ±𝑑𝑙!!𝑑𝑟 = ± 𝜕!𝜋!𝜕𝑙!!𝜕𝑙!! ∙ 𝜕!𝜋!𝜕𝑙!!𝜕𝑙!!  
 
The equilibrium strategy of B will depend on: 
a) Whether there are joint economies or diseconomies across markets. 
b) Whether a more aggressive strategy by firm 1 in market B (increase 𝑙!!) raises or 
lowers firm 2´s marginal profitability. !!!!!!!!!!!!  represents the change in the marginal profitability to firm 2 when firm 1  
increases its quantity (or it is more “aggressive”).  
With undifferentiated product (as Coltan) and constant elasticity demand, we define 
strategic substitutes !!!!!!!" !!!" < 0 	  when q!" < q!"  and strategic complements as !!!!!!!!!!!! > 0	  when 𝑞!! > 𝑞!! . 
The optimal response of firm 2 depends on the relation: 
• With strategic substitutes, to a more aggressive play by firm 1; firm 2 must play 
less aggressive (decrease 𝑙!!). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Positive shock is defined as a decrease in “r”; being r the factor of the tax on profits established by the government. 
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• With strategic complements, to a more aggressive play by firm 1; firm 2 must 
play more aggressive as well (increase 𝑙!!). 
B - The Two-stage Game  
We may extend our model to a Two Stage Game and we consider two countries, A and B, 
with a single firm located in each (firms 1 and 2). The firms compete in quantity and 
prices in each market, producing a non-differentiated good. Firms have access to the 
same production technology. 
Let firm 𝑗 where 𝑗   ∈    1, 2 , operate in country 𝑖, where 𝑖   ∈    𝐴,𝐵 , producing Coltan in 
an international market with a demand function 𝑃 = 𝐷(𝑄)  where 𝑄 = 𝑄! + 𝑄! 
according to a common production function 𝑄! = 𝑓 𝑙!  where 𝑙! = 𝑙! is the amount of 
workers employed in Coltan production in country 𝑖. A civil war is also taking place in 
each country. Soldiers are recruited as “labour” for the military sector, which is dedicated 
to the civil war activities. Salary levels in country 𝑖 positively depend on the soldiers 𝑠! 
and workers  𝑙! demanded by the two sectors of the country according to an inverse supply 
function 𝑤! = 𝑤  (𝑠! + 𝑙!), where 𝑤! = 𝑤!. 
Each country’s Coltan duopolist is facing fixed costs 𝐹  (they can be seen as the 
reservation profit of the investors, below, which they would move their funds to another 
country):  
Being,  𝐶! = 𝑤!𝑙! + 𝐹                                                             (10) 𝜋!   = 𝑝𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙! − 𝐹                          (11) 𝜋!   = 𝑝𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙! − 𝐹                          (12) 
Bearing this in mind, and the fact that government wants to motivate its country’s 
duopolist to maximise profit from Coltan (which is then used to finance the war), the 
government collects 𝑇! = 𝑟𝜋!    as a tax on profits. These funds are used as capital 
employed in war activities whose value to the government is determined as the difference 
between a (Cobb-Douglas) war-production function: 𝑉! = 𝑇!𝑠!  and soldiers recruiting 
costs: 𝐶! = 𝑤!𝑠!. 
Thus, the government acts as a leader employing 𝑠! to maximise 𝐺! = 𝑇!𝑠! − 𝑤!𝑠! and 
firms follow employing 𝑙! to maximise 𝜋!   = (1− 𝑟) 𝑃𝑓(𝑙!)− 𝑤!𝑙! − 𝐹 . 
Regarding the tax established by the government 𝑇! = 𝑟𝜋!  , Eaton and Grossman (1986) 
take the level of output as strategic variable, concluding that trade or industrial policy 
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decisions may raise domestic welfare if oligopolistic profits can be shifted to home 
country firms. Furthermore, in a duopoly case as ours, profits may be shifted only if 
firm´s conjectural variations differ from the real equilibrium strategies that would result if 
they were to alter their output quantities. The decision between a subsidy or a tax will 
depend in this specific case on whether the domestic firm´s output in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium overpasses or not the quantity under “consistent” or Stackelberg hypothesis. 
We can solve our two-stage game using backward induction. Thus, we focus, firstly, on 
the equilibrium in the International Coltan duopoly taking war activities in each market as 
given.  
As per above,   𝑙! = 𝑙!  and 𝑤! = 𝑤! , therefore, firm 𝑗’s profit-maximising problem is 
equivalent to:  𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓(𝑙!) 𝑓 𝑙! − 𝑤(𝑠! + 𝑙!)𝑙!  which should be achieved by (𝑙!, 𝑙! , 𝑠!) 
satisfying the following F.O.C:  𝜕𝜋!𝜕𝑙! =   𝜕 𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓 𝑙! 𝑓 𝑙! − 𝑤 𝑠! + 𝑙! 𝑙!𝜕𝑙! = 0    ⟹   ⟹   𝜕 𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓 𝑙! 𝑓 𝑙!𝜕𝑙! = 𝜕 𝑤 𝑠! + 𝑙! 𝑙!𝜕𝑙!       ⟹ ⟹ ! ! ! !! !! !!!!! 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓 𝑙! !" !!!!! = ! ! !!!!!!!!   𝑙! +   𝑤 𝑠! + 𝑙! ⟹  ⟹ 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑄! ∙ 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! 𝑄! + 𝑃 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! = 𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑙!   𝑙! +   𝑤  ⟹   ⟹ 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑄! 𝑄! + 𝑃 = 𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑙!   𝑙! +   𝑤   ⟹ ⟹ !!!!!! 𝑃 1− !!!!! = 𝑤 1− !!!!!                                                                                   (13) 
Where 𝜀!!! is the Coltan demand elasticity and 𝜀!!!  is the miners’ demand elasticity in 
country A. 
Suppose for a moment the elasticities 𝜀!!!, 𝜀!!!   are constant. 
Therefore, when an increase of soldiers in one country raises wages to maintain the above 
FOC, price must also increase, implying a lower employment of labour. In fact, the 
decrease in labour will be higher (lower), the more (less) productive are the workers in 
the Coltan sector. Obviously, the slope of demand 𝐷  and salary 𝑤 functions will also play 
a role if elasticities are not constant. 
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Assume 𝑙!! 𝑠!, 𝑠! , 𝑙!!(𝑠! , 𝑠!)  are the Nash equilibrium employment levels resulting 
from the solution of the system of FOCs obtained from the analysis of the Coltan market 
competition stage of the game.  
Government A’s objective is to maximise 𝐺! = 𝑟𝜋!𝑠! − 𝑤!𝑠!.  𝑀𝑎𝑥  [𝑟𝜋!! 𝑠!, 𝑠! 𝑠! − 𝑤 𝑠!, 𝑠! 𝑠!]⟹ 𝑟𝜋! 𝜕𝜋!𝜕𝑠! ∙ 𝑠!𝜋! + 𝜋!𝜋! = 𝑤 𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑠!    ∙ 𝑠!𝑤 +   𝑤𝑤 ⟹   ⟹ 𝑟𝜋! 1− 𝜀!,  !! = 𝑤 1− !!!!!                                                                                   (14) 
Where 𝜀!!!  is the soldiers demand elasticity in country A and 𝜀!,  !! is the elasticity of the 
profits of firm 1 in country A with respect to the soldiers’ demand in country A. 
If we take the elasticities 𝜀!!!  for the moment to be constant, but 𝜀!,!! depending positive 
or negatively on 𝑠!, w will obtain two possible results; if 𝜀!,  !! is negative, a higher 
recruitment of soldiers means a lower level of producers’ profits, but the contrary holds 
when the 𝜀!,!! is positive.  
If the aforementioned relation holds, meaning that, 𝑟𝜋! 1− 𝜀!,  !! = 𝑤 1+ !!!!!  the 
Government’s decision of setting a determined level of r must be compensated in the 
labour market, through the wage level, 𝑤. Therefore, when the relation among the level 
of profits of the producers and the level of soldiers is positive, the Government may 
establish a higher 𝑟 to the level that would set if 𝜀!,  !! < 0. 
We conclude that when country B hires more soldiers, wage also increases and therefore 
Coltan price must also increase to compensate this effect, implying a lower level of 
labour. Therefore, a positive relation among number of soldiers and Coltan profits holds, 
and the Government may set a higher 𝑟. 
As we already stated above, 𝑟 defines the level of funds for Government to finance the 
war. This leads to a value for the Government defined as 𝐺! = 𝑟𝜋!𝑠! − 𝑤!𝑠!  that 
Government will maximise when 𝜀!,!! is positive.  
An interesting extension to this line of research would be to analyse the impact on the 
“war sector” of Governmental trade policy decisions (export subsidy, tariffs or quotas) 
assuming both firms produce only for third markets, following for instance Brander and 
Spencer (1984).  
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3 - A NUMERICAL APPLICATION OF MODEL 1 
Coltan sector vs War activities in African countries. 
The Coltan market is quite a convoluted one as we have mentioned in our previous 
sections. Currently, two countries, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, 
are the main exporters of Coltan to third countries (developed countries, mainly the 
United States and North European States). 
The political situation within DRC is untenable despite the efforts of NGOs and 
International Organisations to obtain a ceasefire; the exploitation of the precious natural 
resources provides enough funds to finance a civil war, which has killed 5.4 million 
people already. 
In this political scenario, countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and 
Burundi have been accused of using the revenues from Coltan contraband to promote war 
in the area. 
We analyse in this section the level of motivation of governments to promote war, to 
finally find out that a contagion effect that exists between adjacent wars and Government 
is better off (higher value of 𝑉) when more soldiers are recruited.  
We consider a Coltan world demand function 𝑃 = 𝐴 − 𝑄  where 𝑄  is defined as 𝑄 = 𝑞! + 𝑞!, the sum of each country (A, B) Coltan production, on the basis of domestic 
labour (𝑘: productivity). Then, 𝑞! = 𝑘𝑙! and 𝑞! = 𝑘𝑙! . 
Formation of domestic wages 𝑤!, 𝑤! following labour 𝑙!, 𝑙! and soldier 𝑠!, 𝑠! demand 
as: 𝑤! = 𝑤! + 𝑡 𝑙! + 𝑠!  𝑤! = 𝑤! + 𝑡(𝑙! + 𝑠!) 
Where 𝑡 defines the market power of the monopsonist or what is the same, the slope of 
the labour-supply function.  
In our model, we have a duopsony, the Government hiring soldiers (𝑠!) and the Coltan 
mine owner (𝑙!) hiring miners. Therefore, the higher the monopsonist market power, the 
higher is the effect of the employed labour increase over w. 
Domestic profits from Coltan are defined as: 𝜋! = 𝑝𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙!  𝜋! = 𝑝𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙!  
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
Chapter 3  
 Page 80 
Firms’ strategic variables are employment levels 𝑙!, 𝑙!. Applying FOCs !!!!!! =   0,∀  𝑖 =𝐴,𝐵 (and securing SOCs !!!!!!!! < 0 are also satisfied) we obtain reaction function in A’s 
labour market:   𝑅! → 𝑙! = !"!!!!!!!"!!!!!(!!!!)  and analogous for 𝑅! → 𝑙! = !"!!!!!!!"!!!!!(!!!!)  
Whose simultaneous solution gives equilibrium employment levels: 𝑙! = 𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 − 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝑘!(2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤!)3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑡 + 4𝑡!  𝑙! = 𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 − 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝑘!(2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤!)3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑡 + 4𝑡!  
Yielding equilibrium profits: 
𝜋! = 𝑘! + 𝑡 −𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 + 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! + 𝑘! 2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! !3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑡 + 4𝑡! !  
𝜋! = 𝑘! + 𝑡 −𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 + 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! + 𝑘! 2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! !3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑡 + 4𝑡! !  
Assume now that a Government derives “value” according to a Cobb-Douglas “war 
production function” minus recruiting (labour) costs as:   𝑉!" = 𝑟!𝜋!𝑠! − 𝑤!𝑠! 𝑉!" = 𝑟!𝜋!𝑠! − 𝑤!𝑠! 
We could assume that “soldiers” 𝑠!, 𝑠!  require a risk premium 𝑞 above the domestic 
wage, but, for simplicity, we assume a uniform wage across “professions”, which does 
not affect qualitatively the results presented here.  
For the moment, assume: 𝑤! = 0; 𝑟 = 0.9;   𝑘 = 1; 𝑡 = 1;𝐴 = 100. 
The graph below (assuming No War in country B, or 𝑠! = 0) indicates there is an optimal 
number of soldiers (achieving maximal Government value).  
 
 
Figure 4:  
Government value in country A, in 
accordance to the number of soldiers (𝑠!) and 𝑟 = 0.9. 
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In addition, if the other country has also war (𝑠! > 0). 
The following graph shows the relation between adjacent “wars”.   
Figure 5:  
War Transmission through 
International Trade. 
Surface represents Government A  
benefits as a function of soldier 
recruitment in Country A and 
Country B. 
Finally, it is clear that, for higher 𝑟, 
the optimal army force increases and 
so does the Government’s “value” 𝑉!". 𝑠! = 0; 𝑟 = 0.5 
Figure 6: 
Government value in country A, 
in accordance to the number of 
soldiers (𝑠!) and (𝑟 = 0.5). 
With optimal 𝑠! = 21  and 
maximal 𝑉!" = 3611.16  vs 𝑠! = 0, 𝑟 = 0.9 
 
 
Figure 7: 
Government value in country A, 
in accordance to the number of 
soldiers (𝑠!) and (𝑟 = 0.9). 
 
 
 
With optimal recruitment of soldiers at 𝑠! = 23  and maximal Government value, 𝑉!" = 7112.64 
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A maximal value of 𝑉!" demonstrates that the Government prefers to increase the share 
of profits that goes to the war industry, which also leads to a higher soldier-recruiting 
level 
4 - MODEL 2:  
Analysis of the effect of industrial policy decision on war activities 
Governments can use industrial policy efficiently as a control tool in the trade of illegal 
goods. An efficient intervention may reward with an increase on the level of national 
welfare and political stability. 
Industrial policy decisions as output taxes and subsidies affect not only the level of 
competitiveness of the firms operating in the market but also the welfare of their 
consumers. A central assumption in the debate for the analysis of the effects of 
interventionist policies is that international markets are oligopolistic or imperfectly 
competitive, either because:  
• Governments have cartelised the domestic firms via tax policy or marketing 
arrangements, 
• There are only a few firms competing in the market; or 
• The products are differentiated. 
There is extensive literature in the analysis of how interventionist trade policies can 
increase national welfare in environments with different levels of competition. In 1984, 
Brander and Spencer analysed how in a model Nash-Cournot with two monopolists 
competing in a third market, the Government can establish an optimal export subsidy 
before firms make product decisions. Later, Dixit extended their model to a case with 
more than two firms and concluded that an export subsidy is still optimal as long as the 
number of firms in each market is not too large. Krugman (1984) also demonstrated as 
under increasing returns to scale, protection of domestic firms could prove positive for 
the firm´s advantage in foreign markets by lowering its marginal costs. And finally, Eaton 
and Grossman analysed the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy decisions in an 
oligopoly and characterised optimal intervention under different assumption on market 
structure and conduct, concluding that subsidy is usually indicated for Cournot behaviour, 
but a tax proves to be optimal when firms engage in Bertrand competition.  
Our purpose here is to analyse the effect of a tax on product unit in an environment when 
two domestic firms are competing with a perfect substitutable good.  
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A - The model 
As per our previous model, we will assume the simplest form of oligopolistic 
competition, a single domestic (country A) with one firm (firm 1) competing with a 
single foreign firm (firm 2) in a foreign market (market B): 𝑗   ∈    1, 2 , 𝑖   ∈    𝐴,𝐵 , 
demand function 𝑃 = 𝐷(𝑄)  where 𝑄 = 𝑄! + 𝑄! , 𝑄! = 𝑓 𝑙!  where 𝑙! = 𝑙!  and 𝑤! = 𝑤  (𝑠! + 𝑙!)  where 𝑤! = 𝑤!. 𝑙 represents the labour force and 𝑤 the salary in each country.  
Each country’s Coltan duopolist is facing fixed costs defined as 𝐹. 
Each market’s Government establishes a tax on product unit defined as 𝛾!,!.  
Being 𝐶! = 𝛾𝑞! + 𝑤!𝑙! + 𝐹, equations (11) and (12) are now:                                         𝜋!   = 𝑝𝑞! − 𝛾𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙! − 𝐹                𝜋!   = 𝑝𝑞! − 𝛾𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙! − 𝐹                
The Government now applies not only a tax on profit as we have seen in Model 1, but 
also a tax on output. Therefore, the Government now collects: 𝑇! = 𝑟𝜋!   + 𝛾𝑄!                  (15) 
Where 𝑟 is the tax on profits established by the Government as we presented in the 
model 1 and 𝛾 is the new tax on output.  
These 𝑇!  funds are public capital employed in war activities whose value to the 
Government is 𝑉! = 𝑇!𝑠! and soldier-recruiting costs are 𝐶! = 𝑤!𝑠!. 
We assume the Government acts as a leader, employing 𝑠! to maximise its profit 𝐺!. 𝐺! = 𝑇!𝑠! − 𝑤!𝑠!⟹ 𝐺! = (𝑟𝜋! + 𝛾𝑄!)𝑠! − 𝑤!𝑠!⟹ 𝐺! = (𝑟𝜋! + 𝛾𝑄! − 𝑤!)𝑠! 
Firms 1 and 2 are the followers, they are employing 𝑙! to maximise their own profit 𝜋!   = 1− 𝑟 𝑃𝑓 𝑙! − 𝛾𝑓(𝑙!)− 𝑤!𝑙! − 𝐹. 
Considering that 𝑤! = 𝑤! and 𝑙! = 𝑙!, firm 𝑗’s profit-maximising problem is: 𝑀𝑎𝑥   𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓(𝑙!) 𝑓 𝑙! − 𝛾𝑓(𝑙!)− 𝑤(𝑠! + 𝑙!)𝑙!  
Equation (13) is now: 𝜕𝜋!𝜕𝑙! =   𝜕 𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓 𝑙! 𝑓 𝑙! − 𝛾𝑓(𝑙!)− 𝑤 𝑠! + 𝑙! 𝑙!𝜕𝑙! = 0       ⟹   𝜕 𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓 𝑙! 𝑓 𝑙!𝜕𝑙! − 𝜕 𝛾𝑓(𝑙𝐴)𝜕𝑙𝐴 = 𝜕 𝑤 𝑠! + 𝑙! 𝑙!𝜕𝑙!       ⟹ ! ! ! !! !! !!!!! 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝐷 𝑓 𝑙! + 𝑓 𝑙! !" !!!!! − 𝛾 = ! ! !!!!!!!!   𝑙! +   𝑤 𝑠! + 𝑙!   
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⟹ 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑄! ∙ 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! 𝑄! + 𝑃 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! − 𝛾 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! = 𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑙!!   𝑙! +   𝑤  ⟹   ⟹ 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑄! 𝑄! + 𝑃 − 𝛾 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑙! = 𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑙!!   𝑙! +   𝑤   ⟹ ⟹ !!!!!! 𝑃 1− !!!!! − 𝛾 !!!!!! = 𝑤 1− !!!!!                                                                   (13’) 
 
Where 𝜀!!! is the Coltan demand elasticity and 𝜀!!!  is the miners’ demand elasticity in 
country A. 
Therefore, we can conclude that any increase in 𝑠! will mean an increase in the salary 𝑤 
and a decrease in the labour force of country A (𝑙!), implying an increase in the margin 
(𝑃 − 𝛾) when the Government establishes 𝛾 and 𝑃! > 𝑃. 
We now assume 𝑙!! 𝑠!, 𝑠! , 𝑙!!(𝑠! , 𝑠!)  as the Nash equilibrium employment levels 
resulting from the above FOC’s . 
The Government A’s objective is to maximise its profit 𝐺!: 𝑀𝑎𝑥  [𝐺! = 𝑟𝜋!! 𝑠!, 𝑠! + 𝛾𝑄! − 𝑤 𝑠!, 𝑠! 𝑠!] ⟹ 𝑟𝜋! 𝜕𝜋!𝜕𝑠! ∙ 𝑠!𝜋! + 𝜋!𝜋! + 𝛾𝑄! 𝜕𝑄!𝜕𝑠! ∙ 𝑠!𝑄! + 𝑄!𝑄! = 𝑤 𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑠!    ∙ 𝑠!𝑤 +   𝑤𝑤 ⟹   ⟹ 𝑟𝜋! 1− 𝜀!,  !! + 𝛾𝑄!(  1− 𝜀!!!,  !!) = 𝑤 1− !!!!!                                                (16) 
Where 𝜀!!!  is the soldiers’ demand elasticity in country A and 𝜀!,  !! is the elasticity of 
the profits of firm 1 in country A with respect to the soldiers’ demand in country A. 𝜀!!!,  !! defines the elasticity of the Coltan demand in country A with respect to the 
soldiers’ demand in country A. 
If we now compare equations (14) and (16), then the max 𝐺! for Model 1 and 2 
respectively, is in Table 6 below:  
Table 6: Model 1 and Model 2 Maximisation solutions 
 
MODEL 1 𝑟𝜋! 1− 𝜀!,  !! = 𝑤 1− 1𝜀!!!  (14) 
MODEL 2 𝑟𝜋! 1− 𝜀!,  !! + 𝛾𝑄!(  1− 𝜀!!!,  !!) = 𝑤 1− 1𝜀!!!  (16) 
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We observe that the government’s decision of setting r and 𝛾  must be compensated in 
the labour market, through the wage level, 𝑤. Therefore, when 𝜀!,  !! > 0 and 𝜀!!!,  !! >0, the government may establish a higher r and 𝛾 to the level that would set if 𝜀!,  !! < 0 
and 𝜀!!!,  !! < 0. 
We also observe a trade-off effect between 𝑟 and 𝛾, the higher is 𝑟  the  lower  will  be  the  level  of  output  and  therefore,  the  lower  will  be  the  level  of  capital  obtained  via  𝛾𝑄!. 
The dependence and relation among the governmental profit and the level of soldiers 
hired by the Government relies on the elasticity of the labour force within the country. If 
the Government benefits from a higher profit, the higher is the elasticity of the labour 
force; we could then argue this might be one of the possible reasons for the promotion of 
war in countries of a low income level where the soldiers’ labour elasticity is >1. 
5 – A NUMERICAL APPLICATION OF MODEL 2 
As we did in section 3, we may now develop a numerical application of the model 
presented in section 4.  
We consider a linear Coltan world-demand function as 𝑃 = 𝐴 − 𝑄. 
Our model also considers two firms, firm 1 and 2 and two countries, country A and B. 𝑄  is defined as 𝑄 = 𝑞! + 𝑞!  , the sum of each firm (1, 2) Coltan production. The 
production level of each firms depends on the quantity of workers hired by the firm and 
their productivity represented by 𝑘, where 𝑞! = 𝑘𝑙! and 𝑞! = 𝑘𝑙!. 
Formation of domestic wages 𝑤!, 𝑤! following labour 𝑙!, 𝑙! (where 𝑙! = 𝑙! and 𝑙! = 𝑙!) 
and soldier 𝑠!, 𝑠! demand: 𝑤! = 𝑤! + 𝑡(𝑙! + 𝑠!) 𝑤! = 𝑤! + 𝑡(𝑙! + 𝑠!) 
Where 𝑡 defines the market power of the monopsonist or what is the same, the slope of 
the labour supply function.  
In our model, we analyse the effect of Government industrial policy decisions where the 
Government opts for adding new taxes, which will evidently affect the domestic profits 
from Coltan for each firm, now defined as:  𝜋! = 1− 𝑟! 𝑝𝑞! − 𝛾!𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙!  𝜋! = 1− 𝑟! 𝑝𝑞! − 𝛾!𝑞! − 𝑤!𝑙!  
Where 𝑟!, 𝑟!, 𝛾! and 𝛾! are the taxes established by each Government in countries A and 
B. 
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Firms’ strategic variables are employment levels 𝑙!, 𝑙!. Applying FOCs !!!!!! = 0  (and 
securing SOCs 
!!!!!!!! < 0 are also satisfied), we obtain reaction function in A’s labour 
market:  𝑅! → 𝑙! = !(!!!!!!!!)!!"!!!!!(!!!!)  and analogous for 𝑅! → 𝑙! = !(!!!!!!!!)!!"!!!!!(!!!!) . 
Whose simultaneous solution gives equilibrium employment levels: 𝑙! = 𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 − 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝑘! 2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝛾!𝑘 − 2𝛾!𝑘(𝑘! + 𝑡)(3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑤 + 4𝑤!)  𝑙! = 𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 − 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝑘! 2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝛾!𝑘 − 2𝛾!𝑘(𝑘! + 𝑡)(3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑤 + 4𝑤!)  
 
Yielding equilibrium profits: 𝜋! = 𝑘! + 𝑡 −𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 + 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! + 𝑘! 2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝛾!𝑘 + 2𝛾!𝑘(𝑘! + 1) !3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑡 + 4𝑡! !  𝜋! = 𝑘! + 𝑡 −𝐴 𝑘! + 2𝑘𝑡 + 2𝑡 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! + 𝑘! 2𝑡𝑠! − 𝑡𝑠! + 𝑤! − 𝛾!𝑘 + 2𝛾!𝑘(𝑘! + 1) !3𝑘! + 8𝑘!𝑡 + 4𝑡! !  
Assume now that a Government derives “value” according to a Cobb-Douglas “war 
production function” minus recruiting (labour) costs and taxes: 𝑉!" = 𝑟!𝜋! + 𝛾𝑞! − 𝑤! 𝑠! 𝑉!" = 𝑟!𝜋! + 𝛾𝑞! − 𝑤! 𝑠! 
We could assume that “soldiers” 𝑠!, 𝑠!  require a risk premium 𝑞 above the domestic 
wage, but for simplicity we assume a uniform wage across “professions” that does not 
affect qualitatively the results presented here.  
We may now run a comparison on the values we obtain in Model 1 - where we apply 
only a tax on profits, and Model 2 – where we apply a tax on profits 𝑟 and a tax on 
output 𝛾 . Table 7 below shows the optimum for each scenario: 
We assume there is no war on the other country, so 𝑠! = 0. 
 Table 7: Model 1 and Model 2 Optimal Solutions 
 
Model Parameters Optimal Solution 
Model 1 𝑟! = 0.5 𝛾!   ∄ 𝑠! = 21 Maximal 𝑉!" = 3611.16 
Model 2 𝛾! = 0.5 𝑠! = 21 
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Maximal 𝑉!" = 3703.14 
𝛾! = 0.9 𝑠! = 21 Maximal 𝑉!" = 3775.51 
Model 1 
𝑟! = 0.9 
𝛾!   ∄ 𝑠! = 23 Maximal 𝑉!" = 7112.64 
Model 2 
𝛾! = 0.5 𝑠! = 23 Maximal 𝑉!" = 7158.86 
𝛾! = 0.9 𝒔𝑨 = 𝟐𝟑 Maxima 𝑽𝒈𝑨 = 𝟕𝟏𝟗𝟒.𝟕𝟕 
The parameters values for both Models are: w = 1;   k = 1; l = 1;A = 100;𝑤! = 0  ∀  i = A,B 
  
We observe that the main driver of the Governmental profits is 𝑟 - the tax on profits. The 
higher the tax rate applied on the producers’ profit, the higher is the Government profit, 𝑉!".  𝑟 also defines the number of soldiers the Government will hire, the higher is 𝑟, the higher 
is 𝑠!. In both models when 𝑟! = 0.5, the optimal number of soldiers is 𝑠! = 21. When 𝑟! 
increases to 𝑟! = 0.9, the optimal increases as well to 𝑠! = 23.  
The addition of a new tax, 𝛾!, does not change the optimal number of soldiers that the 
Government will hire but 𝑉!"  will increase slightly. 
Therefore, the higher level of 𝑉!"  is reached with 𝒓𝒊 = 𝟎.𝟗;𝜸𝒊 = 𝟎.𝟗. 
We observe that because there is a positive relation among the number of soldiers and 
producers’ profits, the government may set a higher tax rate on profit.  
The level of labour hired by the Government for war activities will have consequences on 
the wage level; and so it does over the price of the input, which will adjust accordingly 
via an increase.  
6 - CONCLUSION 
Our paper suggests a theoretical framework for analysing the interaction between 
production and war sectors in a context of international duopolistic competition. We  
can assume two countries supply an input in the international market and both of them 
are users of the domestic labour force, which may be employed in two activities: 
production and war.  
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We conclude that the strategies followed by the production sector in the domestic 
market may affect the second market, so companies define their strategies depending on 
whether the competitor´s products are strategic substitutes or complements. Such 
decisions will imply two kinds of externalities: 
1. War is possible because it is supported by the profits of the producers. When 
producers maximise their own profits, they are equally maximizing the 
Governmental value 𝑉! = 𝑠! ∙ 𝑇! which defines the level of funds dedicated by 
the Government to war activities.  
2. The level of labour hired by the Government for war activities will have 
consequences on the wage level; and so it does over the price of the input, which 
will adjust accordingly via an increase. Therefore, a positive relation among 
number of soldiers and producers’ profits holds, and the government may set a 
higher tax rate on profit.  
Our model proves that a phenomenon of war contagion among countries appears when 
strategic complementarity stands. Therefore, authorities must take it into account when 
defining their policies.  
We conclude that the dependence and relation between the Governmental profit and the 
level of soldiers hired by the Government relies on the elasticity of the labour force 
within the country. The Government will enjoy a higher profit the higher is the elasticity 
of the labour force. 
We argue this could be one of the possible reasons for the promotion of war in countries 
of a low income level where the soldiers labour elasticity is >1. 
Therefore with our model we explain why Governments might be motivated to promote 
war in countries where the following circumstances occur:  
1- There exists a Natural Resource that produces an opportunity for companies to set 
themselves up in the country. This allows the Government to obtain funding to 
support the war.  
2- The labour market is very elastic. The Governmental profit increases when the 
elasticity of the labour force is greater. We observe that countries with low level of 
income are more elastic than developed countries. 
Some extensions to this research could be related to the type of information that the 
firms have at their disposal. Collie and Hviid (1999) present an interesting study about 
the effect of the tariffs established by the government on the decision-making process of 
the firms (i.e. the equilibrium) depending on the level of information of the game. 
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Cooper and Riezman (1988) investigate the design of trade policies in a world of 
certainty; with a sufficient amount of uncertainty, both governments regulate their firms 
through subsidies. 
Authors such as Furusawa et al. (2004) examine which policy measures should be put in 
place (derive the optimal tariff or import quota) to maximise domestic welfare. 
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FOREWORD 
“It isn’t enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn’t enough to 
believe in it. One must work at it.” 
Eleanor Roosevelt. 
Broadcast. Voice of America, 11 November 1951.  	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1 - CONCLUSION 
We began this work with the goal of raising awareness of the responsibility that the 
developed world has toward the active conflicts in the developing countries. Sometimes, 
the physical distance from a conflict immunises us from the death and violence that is 
happening thousands of miles away and so we rely upon our Governments and 
International Institutions to sort out the issue. We have seen throughout this work the 
efforts and strategies that have been set-up to control the illegal traffic of the inputs that 
is used by certain elites and different groups to keep the conflict active and therefore 
support their own financial interests. We have discussed certain initiatives such as the 
Dodd-Frank 1502 act or the OECD guidance, for instance, still have not brought the 
expected results.  
The reality is that an isolated action cannot change a political situation and improve the 
living conditions of an entire society. We know that. However, the joint action of the 
international community, international institutions, governments, private organisations 
and business community can definitely make a difference. 
We believe that solutions cannot be found if there is not a deep analysis of the sources 
of conflict and a broad study of all the roles and interests of all the parties involved. The 
agendas of the participants define the current and future conflict strategies that the 
participants will implement in order to achieve their goals (Collier, 1999), leading to a 
“new war economy”. 
The deep transformation that wars have suffered leads us to think that solutions that had 
positive results before the Cold War would not make any difference in today’s conflicts. 
Most of the current conflicts have a self-financing nature where the State is not the 
central player. State armies no longer characterise the conflicts of the post-Cold War 
era; new wars are now led by local warlords, paramilitary units and mercenary groups 
who challenge the authority of the State and finance themselves and the conflict via 
illegal trade in drugs, weapons and natural resources.  
We have centred our analysis on the conflict financed by the predation of natural 
resources and we have specifically focused on the war still active in DRC, mostly 
financed by the illegal exploitation of Coltan. 
Coltan is a metallic ore, essential for the hi-tech industry among others. Despite natural 
resources being seen as a source of growth or economic development, this is only true 
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for the developed world. In the developing countries as Ross (2001) said, they become a 
curse that has detrimental effects on their socio-economic and political stability. Hence, 
the importance of finding and implementing adequate political responses to promote 
more equitable economic development and fair trade.  
Chapter three has presented our contribution to the analysis of the effect of state policies 
and/or governmental actions on conflicts. We have introduced a theoretical framework 
for analysing the interaction between a productive sector and the war activities in a 
context of duopolistic competition. The model proves a phenomenon of war contagion 
among countries when strategic complementarity stands. In addition, it explains why 
Governments might have a motivation for the promotion of war in countries where 
these two circumstances occur:  
1- there are natural resources; 
2- the labour market is highly elastic.  
And therefore, we conclude that authorities and organisations need to extend the scope 
of their analysis when assessing the design and implementation of new policies and 
strategies. 
As a final reflection, we would like to add that we are all aware that conflicts have a 
high cost for society: massive capital destruction, casualties, enormous decrease of the 
level of security and welfare, etc. However, wars also act as an economical sector 
within the labour market – as we demonstrated through our models. The level of activity 
in the war sector affects directly the production sectors via the labour market. This 
thought has been the basis of this thesis, which could be extended in the near future by 
adding certain variables to our models and testing their effect on the medium and long 
run. We bear in mind variables such as the number of deaths, casualties, the detriment 
of human capital and variability on wages, among others.  
As mentioned above, we have also discussed different solutions that have been 
implemented either by the United Nations, the US Government or the OECD. However, 
we have seen after our analysis of the current situation in DRC, that none of these 
actions has had so far a remarkable effect on the level of development of the country or 
the improvement of the living conditions for the local community.  
The country still appeared, in the 2014 ranking of HDI (Human Development Index by 
UN), in 186th position out of 188 countries and remains far from reaching the MDG 
(Millenium Development Goals), which were supposed to be accomplished by 2015.  
	   Final Thoughts  
Chapter 
 
 Page 97 
So, what has failed? Why is DRC still lagging behind despite being a country rich in 
natural resources and despite the efforts and co-operation of the international 
community? The response is not just straight and clear. However, it looks to us that the 
dark and hidden interest of certain parties (those agendas to which we were referring) 
and the high level of corruption do not allow the country to catch up with other African 
economies showing double-digit growth rates. Ethiopia is growing at a 10% annual rate, 
for example, and is the 173th country in the HDI ranking; in addition, Ethiopia has 
reached their target in the MDG. However the source of Ethiopia’s growth is not its 
endowment of natural resources (not as vast as the one of DRC) but its services and 
agricultural industry. This drives us back to our starting point when we referred to the 
“resource curse”, where natural wealth is for most of these countries more of a curse 
than a blessing.  
Certainly measures, such as the Dodd-Frank 1502 Act and the OECD guidance are 
important steps for the regulation of the Coltan market. We have seen the success of the 
Kimberley Certificate process on the regulation of the diamond market. However the 
success comes from the goodwill of all the parties involved. We expect and hope that 
the Coltan market will see more brilliant days in the near future and that regulation and 
transparency becomes a reality.  
We would like to finish with a message of optimism and appeal to the goodwill and co-
operation of the developed world. We all can make a difference if we are aware of the 
outcome and effect of our actions. 
 	  
	     
 
 
	  
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
 
 Page 99 
REFERENCES 
1. Anderson, J.E. and D. Marcouiller (2002). Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: 
An Empirical Investigation. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84: 342-352. 
2. Anderson, J.E. and O. Bandiera (2005). Traders, Cops and Robbers. Journal of 
International Economics, 70: 197-215. 
3. Anderson, J.E. (2015). Terrorism, Trade and Public Policy. Research in 
Economics, 69 (2): 180-190. 
4. Bagley, B.M. (2004). Globalisation and Transnational Organised Crime: The 
Russian Mafia in Latin America and the Caribbean, in Menno Vellinga, ed., The 
Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America and the International 
System, University Press of Florida: 261-296.  
5. Ballentine, K and H. Nitzsche (2005). Profiting from Peace: Managing the 
Resource Dimensions of Civil War. A Project of the International Peace 
Academy, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
6. Barbieri, K. and G. Schneider (1999). Globalisation and Peace: Assesing New 
Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 36 (4): 
387-404. 
7. Berdal, M. and D.M. Malone (2000). Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas 
in Civil Wars, International Development Research Centre, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc. 
8. Brander J.A. (1981). Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities. Journal of 
International Economics, 11: 1-14. 
9. Brander, J. and B.J. Spencer (1984). Export Subsidies and International Market 
Share Rivalry. Journal of International Economics, 18: 83-100. 
10. Bremer, S.A. (1992). Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of 
Interstate War, 1816-1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(2): 309-341. 
11. Buhaug, H. and H. Gates (2002). The Geography of Civil War. Journal of Peace 
Research, 39 (4): 417-433. 
12. Bulow, J and J. Geanakoplos (1983). Strategic Resource Extraction: When Easy 
Doesn´t Do It. Mimeographed, Stanford, Calif. Discussion Paper, 675. 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
 
 Page 100 
13. Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J. and P. Klemperer (1985). Multimarket Oligopoly: 
Strategic Substitutes and Complements. Journal of Political Economy, 93: 488- 
511. 
14. Clausewitz, C.v. (1832). On War. Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham and 
produced by Charles Keller and David Widger, the Project Gutenberg. 
15. Cockayne, J., Mikulaschek, C. and C. Perry (2010). The United Nations Security 
Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset. International Peace 
Institute Report, September. 
16. Collie, D. and M. Hviid (1999). Tariffs as Signals of Uncompetitiveness. Review 
of International Economics, 7: 571-579. 
17. Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (1998). On the Economic Causes of Civil War. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (4): 563-573. 
18. Collier, P. (1999). On the Economic Consequences of Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 51: 168-183. 
19. Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 56: 663-695. 
20. Coper, R. and R. Riezman (1989). Uncertainty and the Choice of Trade Policy in 
Oligopolistic Industries. Review of Economic Studies, 56: 129-140. 
21. De Soysa, I. (2000). Natural Resources and Civil War: Shrinking Pie or Honey 
Pot. Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Los Angeles. 
22. Diehl, P.F. (1991). Geography and War: A Review and Assessment of the 
Empirical Literature. International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical 
Research in International Relations, 17(1): 11–27.  
23. Diehl, P. F. (2005). War. London: Sage. 
24. Downs, G. and S.J. Stedman (2002). Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation. 
Ending Civil Wars, by Stedman, S.J., Rothchild, D. and Cousens, E.M., Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc.: 43-69. 
25. Dixit, A. (1984). International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries. 
Economic Conference Papers, 44: 1-16. 
26. Eaton, J. and G. Grossman (1986). Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under 
Oligopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101: 383-406. 
27. Elbadawi, I. and N. Sambanis (2002). How much War will we See? Estimating 
the Prevalence of Civil War in 161 Countries, 1960-1999. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 46 (2): 307-334. 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
 
 Page 101 
28. Furusawa, T., K. Higashida and J. Ishikawa (2004). Tariffs vs Quotas in the 
Presence of Imperfect Competition and Cross-Border Externalities. Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 37: 445-458.  
29. Gates, S. (2002). Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of 
Rebellion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1): 111-130. 
30. Glick R. and A. Taylor (2005). Collateral Damage: The Economic Damage of 
War, 1870-1997. Mimeo UCD.  
31. Grossman, H.I. and H. Taejoon (1991). A theory of War finance. NBER, working 
paper, 3799.  
32. Humphreys, M. (2005). “Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts: Issues and 
Options”, in K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke (eds) Profiting from Peace: 
Managing the Resource Dimension of Civil War, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.: 
25-44. 
33. International Institute for Strategic Studies Database on Armed Conflict.  
34. Joseph-Gabriel, D. (2015). Your Phone, Coltan and the Business Case for 
Innovative Sustainable Alternatives, in Transatlantic Perspectives on Diplomacy 
and Diversity, by Chase, A. Humanity in Action Press: 171-181. 
35. Kapstein, E. (2003). Two Dismal Sciences are Better than One - Economics and 
the Study of National Security: A Review Essay. International Security, 27 (3): 
158-187. 
36. Kaldor, M. (2007). Human Security: Reflections on Globalisation and 
Intervention. Polity Press. 
37. Kaldor, M. and S. Beebe (2010). The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human 
Security and the New Rules of War and Peace. Public Affairs TM. 
38. Kaldor, M. (2012). New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. 
Polity Press. 
39. Kaldor, M. (2013). In Defence of New Wars. Stability: International Journal of 
Security and Development, 2 (1): 1-16. 
40. Kalyvas, S. N. (2001). ‘New’ and ‘old’ civil wars: A valid distinction?. World 
Politics, 54 (1): 99–118. 
41. Keen, D. (2000-a). War and Peace: What’s the difference?. Review of 
International Peacekeeping, 7 (4): 1-22. 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
 
 Page 102 
42. Keen, D. (2000-b). “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence” in Berdal, M. 
and Malone, D. M., (eds.) “Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil 
Wars”, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.: 19-42. 
43. Krugman, P.R. (1984). “Import Protection as Export Promotion: International 
Competition in the Presence of Oligopoly and Economies of Scale” in 
Kierzkoushi, H., (eds) “Monopolistic Competition in International Trade”, 
Oxford University Press: 180-193. 
44. Martin P., T. Mayer and M. Thoenig (2007). Make trade not War?. Review of 
Economic Studies, 75(3): 865-900. 
45. Munkler, H. (2002). The New Wars. Polity Press: Cambridge. 
46. Mwanasali, M. (2000). “The View from Below”, Greed and Grievance, A Project 
of the International Peace Academy. 
47. Naylor, R.T. (1993). The Insurgent Economy: Black Market Operations of 
Guerrilla Organisations. Crime Law and Social Change, 20: 13-51. 
48. OECD (2013). OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains 
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Second Edition. 
OECD Publishing.  
49. PWC (2014). In Brief: SEC issues guidance on conflict minerals disclosures. 
2014-07. 
50. RAID (2004). The Work of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
51. Raeymaekers, T. (2002). Network War: An Introduction to Congo’s Privatized 
War Economy. Brussels: International Peace Information Service.  
52. Ross, M.L. (2001). How Does Natural Resource Wealth Influence Civil War? 
Evidence from 13 Case Studies. International Organization, 58 (1): 35-67. 
53. Ross, M.L. (2003). The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: 
Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa. The Political Economy of Armed 
Conflict, by Ballentine and Sherman, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
54. Schatzberg, M. (1991). Mobutu or Chaos: The United States and Zaire, 1960-
1990. Lanham, Md.: University press of America. 
55. Seay, L. (2012). Hearing on “The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank 
Section 1502: Impacts on America and the Congo”, United States House of 
	   The Economics and Dynamics of Resource Wars  
 
 Page 103 
Representatives Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on International 
Monetary Policy & Trade. 
56. Sprout, H. (1963). Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective. World 
Politics, 15: 187-212. 
57. Stimming, M. (1999). Capital-Accumulation Games under Environmental 
Regulation and Duopolistic Competition. Journal of Economics, 69: 267-287. 
58. United Nations (2003). Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.  
59. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2014). Fact Sheet “Disclosing the 
Use of Conflict Minerals”. 
60. Williams, P. and J.T. Picarelli (2005). “Combating Organised Crime and Armed 
Conflict”, in K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke (eds) Profiting from Peace: 
Managing the Resource Dimension of Civil War, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.: 
123-152 
61. Williams, U.D. (2014). Relevance of Mary Kaldor’s “New Wars” Thesis in the 
21st Century. Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 6(5): 84-88. 
	     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
